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Abstract 
We investigate patterns of abnormal stock performance around insider trades and option 
exercises on the Dutch market. Listed firms in the Netherlands have a long tradition of 
employing many anti-shareholder mechanisms limiting shareholders rights. Our results imply 
that insider transactions are more profitable at firms where shareholder rights are not 
restricted by antishareholder mechanisms. This finding goes against the monitoring hypothesis 
which states that more shareholder orientation and stronger blockholders would reduce the 
gains from insider trading. We show robust support for the substitution hypothesis as insiders 
of firms which effectively curtail shareholder rights enjoy valuable private benefits of control in 
lieu of engaging in insider trading to exploit their position. 
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Bennfentes kereskedés, opciólehívások és a 
vállalat irányítóinak személyes haszna 
 






E tanulmányban a holland részvénypiacon bejelentett legális bennfentes részvénytranzakciókat 
és opciólehívásokat kísérő abnormális hozamokat vizsgáljuk. Hollandiában a tőzsdén jegyzett 
vállalatok hosszú ideje alkalmaznak olyan eszközöket, amelyek a részvényesek jogait csorbítják. 
Vizsgálatunk eredményei szerint a bennfentes kereskedésen elérhető hozam jóval magasabb 
azon vállalatoknál, amelyek nem alkalmazzák a részvényesek jogait korlátozó szabályokat.   
Ez cáfolni látszik az ellenőrzési hipotézist, amely szerint a szélesebb részvényesi jogkör, 
és a nagy részvénytulajdonosok jelenléte mérsékli a bennfentes tranzakciókon kereshető 
profitot. Robusztus eredményeink ugyanakkor igazolják a helyettesítési hipotézist, amely azt 
állítja, hogy a részvényeseket háttérbe szorító vállalatok bennfentesei a pozíciójukat 
kihasználva olyan előnyöket csikarnak ki, amelyek értékesebbek a bennfentes tranzakciókon 
nyerhető profitnál.  
 
 
Tárgyszavak: bennfentes kereskedés, vezetői opciócsomagok, piaci tranzackiók időzítése, 
vállalatkormányzás, részvényesi jogok, felvásárlás ellen védő mechanizmusok 
 









In addition to their attractive compensation packages, executives and other insiders of 
public firms appear to reap further benefits through their position, at the expense of dispersed 
shareholders.  Studies of legal  insider  trading suggest  that insiders use private  information to 
increase profits from their transactions (Seyhun (1986), Lakonishok and Lee (2001), Piotroski 
and Roulstone (2005)). Analyses of insider option exercises have yielded similar results (Huddart 
and  Lang  (2003),  Bartov  and  Mohanram  (2004)).  To  the  extent  that  profitable  trading  is 
conducted at the expense of outside shareholders, insider trading and option exercises based on 
private information constitute one way for managers to abuse their position at the firm. The 
recent option backdating scandal
1 highlights yet another example of insiders’ ill-gotten gains; 
moreover,  besides  being  arguably  unethical,  option  backdating  is  also  against  the  law 
(Narayanan, Schipani and Seyhun (2007)). Analyzing insider transactions is important because 
they have been documented to have a signaling value to investors, in the short term. Given the 
private information content of insider trading and option exercising, the magnitude of profits 
accruing to insiders is an indication of the degree of agency problems at the firm (Bebchuk and 
Fried (2003)).  
Still,  proper  corporate  governance  can  restrain  selfish  managerial  decisions  that  are 
detrimental to the firm: shareholders can prevent abusive actions by monitoring or disciplining 
managers, or even by firing them if they fail to cooperate. The market for corporate control can 
sanction inefficiencies if the new controlling shareholders impose rigor upon, or simply replace 
managers  who  exploit  the  firm.  However,  what  happens  if  legally  imposed  restrictions  on 
shareholder  rights  disable  effective  corporate  governance?  How  can  shareholders  prevent 
managers from setting their own pay, using company assets for private purposes, or engaging in 
insider trading if they do not have the right to replace the board, or, even worse, their voting 
rights are completely stripped? How credible is a takeover threat in a market where two-thirds of 
the firms have a poison pill? 
In this paper we investigate insider trading, option exercises and corporate governance 
using insiders’ transactions in the Netherlands, a market where firms have had a long history of 
oppressing  shareholder  rights.  We  contribute  to  the  extant  literature  on  insider  trading  and 
corporate  governance  by  alleviating  concerns  of  endogeneity  and  addressing  the  causal 
relationship between governance rules and insider trading profits. In 2004, there were significant 
modifications  in  Dutch  corporate  governance  regulations,  which  we  use  as  a  quasi-natural 
                                                 
1 Two late examples include the president and chief operating officer of Monster found guilty of options backdating 
(Bray (2009) and Take Two Interactive Software who agreed to pay $3 million to settle a lawsuit in which they were 
charged with options backdating (Bloomberg News (2009)). 2 
 
experiment. We take a differences-in-differences (DD) approach to examine whether profits to 
insider  trading  changed  as  a  new  corporate  governance  code  and  legislation  strengthening 
shareholder  rights  came  into  effect.  Our  unique  dataset  contains  information  on  blockholder 
ownership, as well as anti-shareholder devices employed by firms. Among these anti-shareholder 
mechanisms, the structured regime is a two-tier board system complemented by the reallocation 
of decision rights within the company at the expense of shareholders, to the supervisory board. 
Priority shares are special voting stock whose holder gains the right to decide on influential 
issues,  usually on  executive  board  and  supervisory  board  nominations.  Preference  shares  are 
tantamount to poison pills and essentially block takeover threats. Depositary receipts are non-
voting certificates with full cash-flow rights issued by a trust, in exchange for deposited shares.  
First, we delineate and theoretically motivate an alternative hypothesis to the monitoring 
argument which has been the only idea to date underpinning the interrelationship between insider 
trading and corporate governance. We conjecture that if private benefits owed to managerial 
entrenchment  outweigh  the  profits  from  insider  trading  (and  option  exercising),  insider 
transactions  will  be  a  substitute  mechanism  that  insiders  resort  to  if  they  are  barred  from 
exploiting other private benefits. Second, we explicitly analyze how the profits earned on option 
exercises by insiders are related to the quality of corporate governance, which, to the best of our 
knowledge is a question that has not been pursued previously in the literature. Third, we provide 
strong empirical support for the substitution hypothesis. This result is valid for insider purchases, 
sales and option exercises, depends on the use of anti-shareholder mechanisms, and is robust to 
the  inclusion  of  several  controls previously  shown  to  affect  abnormal  returns  around  insider 
transactions. Fourth, we use this substitution effect to measure private benefits of control enjoyed 
by insiders.  
Our results indicate that insiders earn an average abnormal return of about 3.5% over the 
40-day window following their purchases. However, this is not because they purchase in response 
to strong stock price performance. On average, purchases, sales and option exercises are preceded 
by  a  40-day  cumulative  abnormal  return  of  -4.55%,  5.53%  and  8.34%,  respectively,  with 
abnormal return trends generally reversing over the same horizon following the transaction. We 
also document that abnormal profits after CEO purchases amount to almost 5%, but when CEOs 
sell, the average abnormal loss is in excess of -10%. Abnormal stock price movements are less 
sharp following transactions of executive board members other than the CEO, supervisory board 
members and other insiders, consistent with an information hierarchy among insiders. 
Our  findings  on  the  relationship  between  corporate  governance  and  insider  trading 
suggest  that  the  government  and  nonfinancial  blockholders  do  not  monitor  insider  trading 
activity. The latter are likely to trade on the same signal, thereby amplifying abnormal returns. 
Concerning the governance mechanisms of the firm, we find strong evidence for the substitution 3 
 
hypothesis. The returns insiders earn on their transactions are higher at firms that do not limit 
shareholder power through anti-shareholder mechanisms. This can be explained in a framework 
where insiders dedicate increased attention to their trades once they are unable to reap private 
benefits of control. Relying on the 2004 corporate governance changes, our DD estimates suggest 
that it is indeed corporate governance rules that impact insider trading profits. This is further 
corroborated by regressions with firm fixed effects. Exploiting the substitution effect uncovered 
in the data, we conservatively estimate the lower bound of entrenchment benefits provided by one 
anti-shareholder mechanism at approximately €13,400 per year. When placing these estimates in 
the context of our sample, we find that insiders of the average firm enjoy private benefits that are 
worth about €300,000. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II we offer a synthesis of 
prior literature on insider trading and insider option exercises, based on which we then develop 
our research hypotheses. Section III describes the measures used to suppress shareholder rights in 
the Netherlands. Section IV presents the data and methodology and in Section V we detail our 
findings  on  insider  trading  and  option  exercises  and  assess  the  robustness  of  our  results.  In 
Section VI we estimate the value of private benefits in monetary terms. Section VII summarizes 
and concludes the paper. 
 
 
II. Literature review and hypothesis development 
 
II.1. Insider trading, option exercises and cross-sectional determinants of insiders’ profits 
 
Insider purchases and sales 
 
By buying (selling) shares of their own firm, insiders increase (decrease) their exposure to 
the  firm’s  share  price.  Exercising  options  and  retaining  the  resulting  share  stake  similarly 
increases an insider’s wealth at risk. In addition, early exercising prior to maturity can also reveal 
to the market the insider’s information about the firm’s prospects. The efficient market paradigm 
holds that the market is strong-form efficient if no investors possess private information that is 
not reflected in stock prices. Market efficiency is of the semi-strong form if prices adjust to 
publicly available information other than historical share prices (Fama (1991)).  
Initially, returns to insider trading were examined to investigate if insiders were able to 
exploit  private  information  to  earn  profits.  Jaffe  (1974)  showed  that  insiders  earn  abnormal 4 
 
returns as they purchase (sell) shares prior to abnormal share price appreciation (depreciation).
2 
The main results of Seyhun (1986, 1998) show that abnormal returns peak around insider sales 
and depict a valley pattern around purchases. His findings are in line with the theory that insiders 
trade on private information. However, the documented abnormal stock price patterns could also 
be explained by contrarian investing: selling after periods of stock price appreciation and buying 
after periods of stock price decline. Notwithstanding, the ample body of literature concerned with 
this  question  shows  that  insiders  earn  higher  returns  on  their  trades  than  a  naïve  contrarian 
strategy would yield, implying that they indeed possess private information.
3 Furthermore, the 
empirical approach of our paper is different from Rozeff and Zaman (1998), Lakonishok and Lee 
(2001), Jenter (2005) and Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) in that we focus on individual trades 
rather than aggregate insider trading, as do Fidrmuc, Goergen and Renneboog (2006) and Ravina 
and Sapienza (2009). 
In  line  with  prior  literature,  we  hypothesize  that  insiders  will  trade  profitably  by 
exploiting  private  information.  We  thus  expect  cumulative  abnormal  returns  (CARs)  to  be 
negative (positive) in periods before an insider purchase (sale), but also that they are positive 
(negative) in the days following the purchase (sale). We furthermore expect that the absolute 
magnitude of the market reaction will be larger to purchases than to sales, for sales can be 
triggered  by  reasons  other  than  private  information,  e.g.  liquidity  needs  or  diversification 
concerns. This argument is supported by the results of Jeng, Metrick, and Zeckhauser (2003) and 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) for US firms, and Friederich et al. (2002) and Fidrmuc et al. (2006) 
for UK firms. 
 
Insiders’ option exercises 
 
We also assess the abnormal stock return patterns around option exercises. The study of 
Huddart and Lang (1996) indicates that exercise behavior is related to prior returns but not to 
                                                 
2 A further question was if outside investors could earn profits using announcements on insider trades. Lorie and 
Niederhoffer (1968), Jaffe (1974) and Chang and Suk (1998) find that the secondary dissemination of information 
still allows for such trading gains. Bettis, Vickrey and Vickrey (1997) show that mimickers of insider trades can earn 
substantial returns, even after subtracting transaction costs. However, the results of Seyhun (1986), Rozeff and 
Zaman (1988) and Friederich, Gregory, Matatko and Tonks (2002) reach opposite conclusions. 
3 Lakonishok and Lee (2001) attempt to disentangle contrarian investment strategies and inside information and 
show  that  even  though  insiders  are  in  general  contrarian  investors,  their  transactions  are  more  informative  in 
predicting future stock performance than are simple contrarian strategies. Jenter (2005) argues that managers have 
contrarian views concerning the stock of their own company and perceive the book-to-market effect as a mispricing. 
Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) document that insider trades are based both on contrarian beliefs and on superior 
(inside) information on future cash flows. Ravina and Sapienza (2009) show insiders have excellent timing abilities 
and are not merely purchasing after periods of stock price decline and selling after the stock price has gone up. The 
results of Fidrmuc et al. (2006) also suggest that insider trades are based on private information.  
 5 
 
subsequent returns. Carpenter and Remmers (2001) find significant positive stock performance in 
the days (months) before insiders exercise their stock options. However, they only document 
negative abnormal returns after exercises by top managers at small firms. Although these two 
studies provide little evidence that insider option exercises are based on private information, the 
findings  of  Huddart  and  Lang  (2003)  and  Bartov  and  Mohanram  (2004)  suggest  otherwise. 
Huddart and Lang (2003) unveil that option exercises are significantly more frequent in advance 
of stock price downturns and conversely, fewer options are exercised prior to periods of stock 
price appreciation. The conclusion of Bartov and Mohanram (2004) is also that option exercises 
are  motivated  by  private  information.  In  particular,  they  claim  that  insiders  know  whenever 
observed good performance is a result of earnings management, and will therefore not persist. 
They further advocate examining large option exercises rather than all transactions, similarly to 
Eckbo and Smith (1998) who give sizeable transactions more weight, in contrast with the stealth 
trading hypothesis of Barclay and Warner (1993).
4 Bartov and Mohanram (2004) argue that this 
difference in methodology is the reason that their findings are at odds with those of previous 
papers. Despite conflicting results of prior studies, we conjecture that insider option exercises are 
based  on  private  information  and  are  therefore  preceded  by  positive  abnormal  returns  and 
followed by negative abnormal performance. 
Option packages customarily have a vesting period of a few years, during which they 
cannot be exercised. From the vesting date the options can be exercised until they expire. Huddart 
and Lang (1996) document that most employees do not wait until expiration to exercise their 
option packages. Brooks, Chance and Cline (2007) reach a similar conclusion as they find that 
92.34% of the options are exercised before the expiration date. The results of Bettis, Bizjak and 
Lemmon (2005) also evidence that early exercise is widespread, with exercise occurring a little 
over two years subsequent to vesting and more than four years prior to expiration on average. 
Options exercised at vesting are more likely converted into shares for liquidity reasons. Insiders 
who hold options that are just about to expire will always exercise them rather than let the option 
grant lapse. Thus, we expect that the absolute magnitude of abnormal returns to be the largest 
around option exercises subsequent to the vesting date but prior to the expiration date.  
It should also not be overlooked that, in addition to timing option exercises, managers 
also pursue other ways of securing additional gains on their option packages.
5 Further phenomena 
documented in the literature include favorable timing of option grants (Yermack (1997), Aboody 
and Kasznik (2000)), repricing option packages that are out of the money (Brenner, Sundaram 
                                                 
4 Eckbo and Smith (1998) study insider trades, rather than option exercises. 
5 Managers are known to alter features of option packages to their own advantage (Bebchuk and Fried (2003)). More 
generally some executives are able to influence their own pay (Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001). Sometimes this 
appears in a blatant manner, when executives sit on their own compensation committee, but there are several other, 
indirect ways they can control their compensation package. 6 
 
and  Yermack  (2000))  and  backdating  (Lie  (2005),  Heron  and  Lie  (2007),  Narayanan  et  al. 
(2007)). Yermack (1997) and Aboody and Kasznik (2000) provide strong evidence that CEOs are 
able to influence the timing of their options awards. If executive stock options are to properly 
motivate management, then the terms of the options should not be altered, most importantly when 
the option becomes worthless due to the actual share price declining below the strike. However, 
Brenner  et  al.  (2000)  show  that the  options of  1.3% of the  executives  in their  sample  were 
repriced with an average price reduction of 40%. Furthermore, smaller firms alter the terms of 
management  options  more  often;  possibly  they  can  do  so  because  they  receive  less  public 
attention. Moreover, recent studies report that some companies have even engaged in the abusive 
and, more importantly, potentially illegal practice of options backdating.
6 Narayanan et al. (2007) 
point  out  that backdating  not only channeled  funds  from  shareholders  to  managers, but  also 
imposed substantial deadweight losses on the firms involved.  
  Provided that there are patterns of abnormal returns around insider transactions, several 
factors  may  drive  the  magnitude  of  these  returns.  Insiders  in  small  firms  have  a  stronger 
informational advantage since these firms receive less attention from analysts. This would imply 
a  negative  correlation  between  the  information  content  of  directors’  dealings  and  firm  size. 
Seyhun  (1986)  provides  empirical  evidence  that  insider  trading  is  more  profitable  in  small 
companies.
7 This relation holds also for option exercises: Carpenter and Remmers (2001) report 
short-term abnormal performance only after exercises by CEOs of small firms. Thus, we expect 
the absolute value abnormal returns around insider purchases, sales and option exercises to be 
inversely related to firm size.  
As our initial position is that insiders can earn abnormal returns using private information, 
we also aim at investigating whether the value of this information differs by insider type. The 
information  hierarchy  hypothesis  asserts  that  insiders  who  possess  more  information  on  the 
operations of the company, i.e. chairmen, chief executives and other officer-directors, are able to 
realize larger profits on their transactions. On one hand, Sheyhun (1986, 1998) and Lin and Howe 
(1990) have found empirical support for this hypothesis. On the other hand, Jeng et al. (2003), 
Fidrmuc et al. (2006) and Betzer and Theissen (2009) discern no such effect for insider trades and 
Huddart  and  Lang  (2003)  report  that  the  option  exercises  by  junior  employees  are  just  as 
informative of the future stock price as exercises by top management. In spite of the latter results, 
we  conjecture  that  share  purchases,  share  sales  and  option  exercises  by  the  chief  executive 
director and other executives are timed more accurately than transactions of other insiders. 
                                                 
6 Backdating of option packages is not illegal in itself. However, if firms do not disclose it, they break accounting 
rules; as such grants are to be recorded as a noncash expense. The SEC has imposed stricter rules in 2006, following 
the backdating scandals (Scannell and Lublin (2006)) 
7 Jeng et al. (2003), however, find no relation between the profitability of insider trading and the size of the firm. 7 
 
II. 2. The effect of corporate governance on insider trading profits 
 
An ample body of literature shows that firms benefit from good corporate governance. 
Strong corporate governance has been documented to positively impact share prices in the long 
run (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), Cremers and Nair (2005)), to decrease agency costs 
(Shleifer and Vishny (1997)) and, recently, to curtail (opportunistic) insider trading (Fidrmuc et 
al. (2006), Rozanov (2008), Ravina and Sapienza (2009)). Firdmuc et al. (2006) introduced the 
notion of blockholder monitoring of insider trading. As large shareholders have a greater stake in 
the company which gives them both stronger incentives to monitor and larger voting power to 
effectively intervene, these shareholders will monitor the firm more closely. However, major 
shareholders are not homogenous in terms of their monitoring quality: their ability and incentives 
to  monitor  hinges  on  their  type  (Holderness  and  Sheehan  (1988)).  The  empirical  results  of 
Franks, Mayer and Renneboog (2001), indicate that large industrial shareholders (and to a lesser 
extent of family shareholdings) have a positive effect on the intensity of monitoring within a 
company,  whereas  institutional  investors  (e.g.  banks,  insurance  companies,  investment  and 
pension funds) usually take a more passive stance.  
Regarding blockholder monitoring of insider trades, Fidrmuc et al. (2006) find that the 
price reaction after purchases is smaller in the presence of blockholders who are likely to monitor 
management, i.e. unrelated individuals, families or corporations. Hence, insider trades are less 
informative for well-monitored firms. Similarly, the empirical findings of Betzer and Theissen 
(2009)  indicate  that  major  block  ownership  by  a  nonfinancial  firm  attenuates  the  absolute 
magnitude  of  abnormal  returns  both  after  purchases  and  sales.  Fidrmuc  et  al.  (2006)  also 
document  for  the  UK  that  the  positive  price  reaction  to  sales  is  greater  in  the  presence  of 
institutional blockholders who do not monitor management, but trade on their signals instead. In 
contrast, Rozanov (2008) argues that  while  transient institutional investors in the US do not 
monitor  insiders,  dedicated  institutions  actually  curb  profitable  insider  trading.  Finally,  the 
market reaction (positive for purchases and negative for sales) is mitigated if the director already 
owns a considerable stake in the company, since in this case outside investors also consider the 
effect of the transaction on director entrenchment (Fidrmuc et al. (2006)). With the above results 
in mind, we conjecture that blockholder monitoring by individuals, families and nonfinancial 
companies impedes profitable insider trading and therefore attenuates abnormal return patterns 
around insider purchases, sales and option exercises. 
Ravina  and  Sapienza  (2009)  provide  evidence  that  governance  rules  also  impact  the 
profitability of insider trades. They show that profits on insider trades are larger at firms with 
weak governance standards as expressed by the Governance Index of Gompers, Ishii and Metrick 8 
 
(2003). Moreover, their findings indicate that the gap between returns on trades of executives and 
trades of independent directors is wider at firms with poor corporate governance rules.  
In  this  paper  we  examine  the  impact  of  corporate  governance  on  the  profitability  of 
insider  trades  and  option  exercises.  To  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  our  paper  is  the  first  to 
investigate the impact of corporate governance on insiders’ option exercises. The two hypotheses 
underlying our analysis are what we shall call the monitoring hypothesis and the substitution 
hypothesis. Although theoretically these hypotheses  are not  mutually exclusive, their testable 
implications are distinct such that the data allow us to verify them separately.  
The  monitoring hypothesis  asserts that  strong corporate  governance curtails profitable 
insider trading, as evidenced by the results of Fidrmuc et al. (2006), Rozanov (2008) and Betzer 
and Theissen (2009). While good corporate governance has been shown, e.g. to decrease agency 
costs, there is no clear-cut explanation as to how it would mitigate profitable insider trading. We 
scrutinize  two  channels  through  which  good  corporate  governance  impacts  insider  trading: 
increased shareholder awareness in the absence of anti-shareholder mechanisms and blockholder 
monitoring.  Thus,  based  on  the  monitoring  hypothesis  we  would  find  less  profitable  insider 
transactions  occurring at  firms  with stronger  corporate governance  standards, i.e. fewer anti-
shareholder  devices.  To  capture  the  effect  of  monitoring  by blockholders  we  control  for  the 
identity of the largest blockholder of the firm. 
The  substitution  hypothesis,  in  contrast,  postulates that gains from insider  trading  are 
larger at firms with strong corporate governance as insiders will substitute insider trading with 
more attractive private benefits at firms where shareholder power is limited, hence corporate 
governance  is  weak.  Under  private  benefits  of  control  we  intend  e.g.  the  use  of  company 
resources for private purposes (Yermack (2006)) or increasing their remuneration by setting low 
performance targets (Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001)). Liu and Yermack (2007) show that 
excessive  CEO  real  estate  purchases  are  often  preceded  by  large  insider  sales  and  option 
exercises. Meanwhile, the firm underperforms the market, suggesting that the grandiose CEO 
home purchases are a sign of CEO entrenchment. We posit that these benefits can outweigh 
potential gains from insider trading and insiders will therefore seek private benefits at firms with 
weak corporate governance. 
The  reader might argue  that insiders could  choose to exploit both private benefits  of 
control and still engage in profitable insider trading. A possible explanation of why insiders at 
firms with weak governance choose only to reap private benefits of control, but not to earn high 
profits on their trades is based on loss of reputation. The Netherlands Authority for the Financial 
Markets (AFM) may investigate the trade (after, and even though, the insider has duly reported it) 9 
 
to  discern  whether  the  insider  has  traded  on  private  information.
8  When  the  AFM  starts  an 
investigation and especially when public prosecution then indicts the insider (even if she is later 
acquitted – as trading on information is hard to prove), suspicions arise in the market about her 
integrity and ability to serve the interest of shareholders. Hence, she faces a loss of reputation that 
may result in the termination of her contract, or not being re-elected. The consequences of a 
tarnished reputation are more severe for insiders of firms with low shareholder rights because, 
given the high level of private benefits that they can enjoy (for several years), they have more to 
lose. Hence they are more averse to a potential loss of reputation and will not time their trades to 
perfection in order not to attract the suspicion of the AFM.  
Also, insiders may refrain from trading on private information if they are able to reap 
private benefits of control, because of risk aversion. Trading on private information does not 
automatically guarantee a gain. The stock price can decline during an unforeseen industry-wide 
shock even if the firm’s prospects are otherwise encouraging. Moreover, the exact magnitude of 
gains is uncertain, unlike with consuming private benefits of control.  
A third idea that can explain why insiders enjoying substantial private benefits would not 
trade on private information is one similar to that of Loughran and Ritter (2002). They show that 
manager-owners act irrationally as they do not mind leaving a considerable amount of money on 
the table in IPOs. Their explanation is that because of the surge in the share price on the day 
following  a  deeply  underpriced  IPO,  managers’  portfolio  wealth  soars.  As  a  consequence, 
managers are not upset about the wealth transfer to new investors and the additional dilution, 
which they could have avoided, had they set a higher price. Although  managers could have 
increased their own wealth further through a higher price, forgone profits appear less important 
when considered alongside the gains they enjoy because of the stock price jump. The notion that 
insiders do not necessarily maximize their own wealth through multiple activities, when their 
gains from one source are large enough, is what we argue as well. Since insiders reap a major 
windfall in the form of private benefits, they may be less interested in further increasing their 
wealth by timing their trades accurately. 
Empirically, the monitoring and substitution hypotheses may not be mutually exclusive. 
This  means  that  in  companies  with  poor  corporate  governance,  insiders  can  extract  private 
benefits of control and perform insider trading. For the substitution hypothesis to hold, the degree 
of  insider  trading  in  firms  where  insiders  are  entrenched  should  be  lower  than  that  in  well 
monitored companies.  
 
 
                                                 
8 The next section, III. 1. describes the Dutch legislation on insider trading and how it is enforced. 10 
 
III. Institutional background: insider trading regulation and corporate governance in the 
Netherlands 
 
III. 1. Insider trading legislation and its enforcement 
 
The essential principles underlying insider trading legislation in the Netherlands hold that 
market  participants  are  barred  from  trading  on  private  information  and  price-sensitive 
information. The former refers to information that is not publicly available, while the latter refers 
to  information  that  is  likely  to  move  the  firm’s  stock  price.
9  In  addition  to  this  prohibition, 
corporate  insiders  are  required  to  report  their  trades  in  the  company’s  stock  and  derivative 
instruments whose value is tied to the firm’s share price (e.g. stock options). Insiders, their family 
up to the second degree, large shareholders and the company itself have an obligation to disclose 
their transactions. This obligation was introduced in April 1999 and required all of the above 
parties to report their transactions no later than 10 days after the end of the month in which they 
took place. Transactions are disclosed to the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets 
(Autoriteit Financiële Markten, AFM) who subsequently publishes this information on its website 
and in the financial daily Financieel Dagblad.  
In October 2002 regulations were tightened: executive board members and supervisory 
board members were obliged to report their trades without delay. Finally, rules were changed 
through  the  2005  ratification  of  the  European  Market  Abuse  Directive.  From  October  2005 
onwards, all insiders are required to disclose transactions at most 5 days after their trade. The 
only exception is if the total value of the insider’s transactions in that calendar year has not 
reached  5000  EUR.  In  these  cases,  the  insider  can  defer  disclosure  until  the  cumulative 
transaction value surpasses the 5000 EUR threshold.
10 Our data suggest that prior to the 2005 
regulatory change, insiders other than the management board and supervisory board members 
disclosed their trades typically 4-7 days after the transaction. Thus, the regulations did not go 
much further than formalizing the status quo. We therefore use day 5 as the reporting day in the 
empirical analysis of the paper. Degryse, De Jong and Lefebvre (2009) analyze the information 
content of insider trades in the different reporting regimes. 
The enforcement of insider trading regulation is the task of the AFM. If, based on the 
analysis of the stock price, the AFM suspects that an insider has traded on private information, it 
launches an inspection. If there is sufficient evidence to corroborate the initial suspicion, the 
                                                 
9 The Dutch legislation is essentially the adoption of two European Union directives, Insider Dealing Directive 
89/592/EEC and its successor, the Market Abuse Directive 2003/6/EC. 
10 This also implies that there is no disclosure requirement if the overall value of transactions initiated by the insider 
does not reach €5,000 in a calendar year. However, in our sample we find several transactions that insiders reported 
even though the value stayed below this threshold. 11 
 
AFM reports the case to the public prosecution, after which the insider is indicted. In some cases, 
the AFM imposes a fine on the company for insider trading. During our sample period the AFM 
started an annual average of 42 inspections leading to 9 reports to public prosecution and 1 
administrative  fine  per  year.
11  This  means  that  neither  the  unconditional  probability  of  an 
inspection taking place, nor the probability of an indictment conditional on being inspected is 
negligible. Therefore, loss of reputation can indeed play a role in insiders’ trading decisions, as 
suggested in the previous section. 
 
III.  2.  Corporate  governance  regulation  and  anti-shareholder  mechanisms  in  the 
Netherlands 
 
Relating the informativeness of insider trades, block trades and insiders’ option exercises 
to  elements  of  corporate  governance  is  of  particular  interest  on  the  Dutch  stock  market.  In 
contrast with the US or the UK and similar to most countries in continental Europe, the Dutch 
model  of  corporate  governance  is  stakeholder-oriented.  It  essentially  aims  at  establishing  a 
consensus among the company’s stakeholders, in particular, employers and employees. Franks 
and Mayer’s (2001) definition of an insider system fully fits the Dutch model: share ownership is 
highly concentrated, there are relatively few listed firms while takeover activity is rather limited 
(Cools and van Praag (2007), McCahery, Sautner and Starks (2009)). 
In the Netherlands, six protective measures are widely used: protective preference shares, 
priority  shares,  certificates,  structured  regime
12,  binding  appointments,  and  voting  caps.  It  is 
common for Dutch firms to instate defense mechanisms (anti-shareholder devices) in the form of 
special securities, thereby explicitly violating the one-share-one-vote principle. The following 
three types of securities are commonly used to curtail the power of ordinary shareholders: 
·  Protective preference shares – tantamount to poison pills – are the most widespread 
antitakeover  device.  Upon  a  takeover  threat,  management  issues  these  securities  to  a 
friendly trust office or outside investor. The shares carry full voting rights and are sold at 
                                                 
11 We obtain these figures from the annual reports of the AFM. Both the number of inspections and the number of 
indictments depict a “U” sharpe during our sample period. Both figures peaked in 1999 (72 inspections and 13 
indictments). Inspections dropped during 2002-2004, reaching the minimum (20) in 2004. The pattern is repeated 
with a lag of one year (showing that gathering evidence is time-consuming) for the number of indictments, which 
decrease sharply during 2003-2005. We observe the minimum (2) in 2004. Numbers rise again from 2005 (2006 for 
indictments) to reach 58 (7) during 2007. 
12 The original Dutch expression structuurregime had several English translations. In legal texts and annual reports 
we  have  found  the  following:  “statutory  two-tier  status”,  “structured  regime”,  “structure  regime”,  “two-tier 
structure”, “dual-board structure”, “structural regulations for large companies”, “structural regime applicable to dual-
board entities”. The Tabaksblat Code uses “statutory two-tier status” and “statutory two-tier rules”. In our study, we 
call this anti-shareholder provision structured regime as it is more than a two-tier structure, which is commonly used 
in Continental Europe, but does not include a substantial reallocation of shareholder powers to the supervisory board. 
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nominal value; however, the purchaser is only to pay 25% of the amount upfront. The size 
of the issue may reach up to 50%, or depending on the amendments in place, even 100% 
of the company’s outstanding nominal capital. 
·  Priority shares, customarily sold to a friendly foundation, grant the bearer special voting 
privileges over matters such as merger approval, public offerings, the appointment of 
board members, charter amendments, and liquidation. These instruments are comparable 
to French or British ‘golden shares’.  
·  Certificates are tradable depository receipts carrying full cash flow rights but stripped of 
voting rights. They are issued in exchange for ordinary voting shares – the supervisory 
board has the authority to request such a transaction –, which are then deposited with the 
issuer  of  the  certificates,  the  administration  office.  Through  this  process  the  legal 
ownership of the shares is transferred to the trust office which thus assumes all voting 
rights  on  the  shares  withdrawn  and  usually  obtains  the  majority  of  the  votes  as  a 
consequence. 
The regulations of Euronext Amsterdam permit companies to install at most two of the above 
security types. This constraint was lifted in 2007, after the end of our sample period. 
An  important  feature  of  the  Dutch  governance  regime  is  that  further  institutionalized 
restrictions may be imposed on shareholder control by law. In addition to the anti-shareholder 
devices  mentioned  so  far,  numerous  Dutch  firms  have  what  is  called  a  structured  regime. 
Limited liability companies are legally obliged to adopt this scheme if their subscribed capital is 
in excess of 11.4 million EUR, they employ at least 100 employees and have a legally installed 
workers’ council. The structured regime deprives shareholders of the majority of their tasks and 
powers, and reallocates them to the supervisory board. As a consequence, the powers of the 
supervisory board are extensive. 
In  a  full  structured  regime,  the  following  powers  are  transferred  to  the  supervisory 
board: establishing the approval of annual accounts, election of management, and even election 
of the supervisory board itself (through co-optation). Moreover, the supervisory board may also 
overrule major decisions taken by the executive board. Although shareholders retain the right to 
vote on payout policy and takeovers, they are practically left with a marginal role in holding 
management accountable. Accordingly, Cuijpers, Moers and Peek (2005) find that companies 
that have a structured regime in place smooth earnings more actively, report more conservatively 
and are less likely to meet or beat analyst forecasts. 
The current law also specifies some exemptions from this two-tier scheme, most notably 
for firms with foreign ownership or international operations. In particular, companies which are 
majority-owned  by  foreign  entities  may  adopt  only  a  mitigated  form  of  the  regime.  This 
mitigated  structured  regime  enables  shareholders  to  vote  on  the  annual  accounts  and  the 13 
 
appointment of management, but preserves the appointment of supervisory board members by co-
optation. Firms are fully exempted if more than 50% of their employees work abroad or if their 
majority owner is a Dutch multinational that has adopted the structured regime. Nonetheless, 
most exempt companies choose to retain a weaker version of the regime, because its full abolition 
requires a statute amendment which the supervisory board can readily block (De Jong, DeJong, 
Mertens, and Wasley (2005)). 
Binding appointments mean that a specific party, other than shareholders, is granted the 
right  to  appoint  board  members.  Bearers  of  priority  shares  commonly  receive  binding 
appointment rights; therefore we do not pursue this measure further. Voting caps, although still 
legal in the Netherlands, have been phased out by listed firms (OECD (2004, 2007)), thus are of 
no interest to our investigation.   
Prior empirical research has shown that the powerful anti-shareholder provisions in place 
at most Dutch firms have far-reaching effects on their financial value and policy. These effects 
are exacerbated even further as most Dutch companies use these devices cumulatively, thereby 
restricting shareholder control severely. Renneboog and Szilagyi (2007) point out that firms that 
operate under any form of the structured regime are more likely to install and also to combine 
preference shares, priority shares and certificates.  
De Jong et al. (2005) find that shareholder control restrictions have considerable valuation 
effects. Specifically, both the full and the voluntary form of the structured regime are associated 
with lower firm values – measured by the market-to-book ratio – as are anti-shareholder devices. 
Accordingly, the  turnout  at annual general meetings is quite low  and those participating put 
forward few proposals or none at all. In turn, management-sponsored proposals are hardly ever 
opposed.  The  findings  of  De  Jong,  Mertens  and  Roosenboom  (2006)  are  illustrative  of  the 
peculiar  features  of  Dutch  companies’  annual  meetings.  For  the  period  of  1998-2002  they 
examine 245 annual meetings and find that on average a mere 30% of shareholders were present, 
only to sponsor no proposals at all. Management, on the other hand, put forward 1583 proposals 
of which only 9 were rejected or withdrawn (Cziraki, Renneboog and Szilagyi (2009)). 
Clearly,  management  may  use  their  voting  power  at  annual  meetings  to  pass 
recommendations on payout policy. Renneboog and Szilagyi (2007) provide empirical evidence 
that firms with a full structured regime in place pay lower dividends and do not smooth payments 
over time. This also holds for Dutch multinationals that retain the structured regime in spite of 
being exempted. Furthermore, preference shares have the same effect on dividend policy, even 
after  controlling  for  the  correlation  (mentioned  earlier)  between  the  adoption of  a  structured 
regime and the use of special securities. 
Given that (i) Dutch companies are reluctant to shift their governance practices, despite 
the  proven  adverse  effect  of  structured  regime  and  other  anti-shareholder  mechanisms  on 14 
 
company value (De Jong et al. (2005)) and (ii) corporate governance mechanisms have been 
shown to impact firm value and financial policy, we conjecture that corporate governance devices 
have an impact also on abnormal return patterns around the events analyzed in this paper – i.e. 
insider trades and option exercises by insiders. The number of anti-shareholder mechanisms is an 
inverse proxy for shareholder power. It follows that, under the monitoring hypothesis, we would 
expect  to  see  more  profitable  insider  transactions  at  firms  with  a  high  number  of  anti-
shareholder mechanisms. The substitution hypothesis yields the opposite prediction: profits on 
insider transactions should be higher at firms with few or no anti-shareholder devices. 
 
III. 3. Corporate governance changes in 2004 
 
In 2004, there were two important modifications in corporate governance practices in the 
Netherlands (Groenewald (2005)). First, on January 1, the new Dutch Corporate Governance 
Code (Tabaksblat Code) came into effect.
13 The Code basically attempted to defuse one of the 
most commonly used anti-shareholder mechanisms by requiring that depositary receipt holders be 
granted voting rights at all times. It further encouraged shareholder participation by advising 
companies to enable proxy voting and facilitate shareholder communication. It also called for a 
more active role of institutional investors in the general meetings. Furthermore, the Code set caps 
on  the number  of  supervisory  board  memberships  assumed  at  other  companies  by  executive 
board members and supervisory board members. The Code was enforced using a “comply of 
explain” approach. 
The  second  change  in  corporate  governance  regulation  came  through  the  Structured 
Regime Reform Act, effective September 1, 2004. The Act primarily cut back on the authority of 
the  supervisory  board,  but  also  increased  shareholder  power  in  other  respects.  It  allowed 
shareholders and the works council to recommend candidates for supervisory board membership, 
prior to the nomination made by the supervisory board. Also the firm’s annual accounts and the 
remuneration of the members of the two boards now had to be approved by the general meeting. 
Moreover, the Act specified that a general meeting of shareholders representing at least one-third 
of the issued capital may reject nominations for supervisory board members and dismiss the 
entire supervisory board with a majority vote. It also required prior shareholder approval for the 
transfer of the company’s business to a third party, the initiation of a sustainable cooperation (e.g. 
a joint venture) with other firms and proposed transactions in the shares of companies if the 
transaction value is greater than or equal to one-third of the firm’s own assets. Furthermore, the 
law explicitly stated the right of both shareholders and holders of depositary receipts to place 
                                                 
13 The ’Tabaksblat’ committee that drew up the Code was chaired by and named after the former Unilever CEO 
Morris Tabaksblat. 15 
 
resolutions on the agenda of general meetings, provided that they hold a stake of at least 1% or 50 
million EUR in the company’s shares. The Act obliged companies to give depositary receipt 
holders voting rights, except in the event of a hostile takeover bid.
14 
As both of these corporate governance changes are aimed at strengthening shareholder 
rights and reducing the impact of anti-shareholder mechanisms, we use the 2004 modifications as 
a quasi-natural experiment. Since the corporate governance changes increased shareholder power, 
they arguably diminished the ability of insiders to enjoy private benefits. Hence, if profitable 
insider  trading  and  reaping  private  benefits  of  control  are  substitutes,  we  should  see  the 
correlation between the two phenomena decline after 2004. We therefore hypothesize that profits 
to insider trading are negatively related to the number of anti-shareholder mechanisms employed 
by the firm until 2004, but not afterwards.  
 
 
IV. Data sources, descriptive statistics and methodology 
 
IV. 1  Sample description 
 
The primary information source for our sample is the public register of the Netherlands 
Authority  for  the  Financial  Markets  (Autoriteit  Financiële  Markten,  AFM).  The  sample 
comprises  purchases,  sales  and  stock  option  exercises  from  April  1999  to  April  2007  of  all 
insiders that have a reporting obligation, as defined in subsection III 1. The register contains 
disclosed  trades  in  stocks,  options  and  warrants.  For  insider  transactions,  AFM  publishes 
information on the company names, insiders’ names, transaction dates, number of instruments 
traded, prices, security type and transaction type. In the case of option exercises, if stocks are 
immediately sold after the exercise, the database also includes the sale price and the number of 
stocks sold.  
The number of AFM disclosures in our initial database totals 15,527 for 134 companies. 
All transactions performed by insiders of companies not quoted on the Dutch stock market are 
erased from the sample, as are trades in convertible securities, restricted share awards, stock 
appreciation  right  awards  and  warrant-related  transactions.  We  aggregate  multiple  insider 
purchases and sales of one insider, taking place on the same day into a single transaction and, in a 
similar  fashion,  aggregate  option  exercises  by  the  same  person  on  the  same  day  into  one 
observation.  If the AFM database indicates that transactions occurred in the weekend (Saturday 
or Sunday), these transactions are dealt with as if they had occurred on the closest neighboring 
                                                 
14 Thus, the Structured Regime Reform Act is not as radical as the Corporate Governance Code. The latter, however, 
is not legally enforceable. 16 
 
trading  day  that  corresponds  with  the  price  paid  by  the  insider.  We  drop  entries  containing 
typographical errors which could not be validated after searching through the firm’s annual report 
and/or retrieving information from Datastream. We also delete transactions that took place within 
40 days of the first quotation of the firm on Euronext Amsterdam as abnormal returns can then 
not be calculated. 
We search the companies’ annual reports to gather information on the role of the insider at 
the  firm,  various  accounting  data  and  anti-shareholder  mechanisms  in  place.  Information  on 
companies’ ownership structure has been gathered using publicly available information disclosed 
on the AFM website and companies’ annual reports. We use Bureau van Dijk’s AMADEUS 
database, to complement any missing data. Information on the characteristics of the exercised 
options,  i.e.  the  grant  date,  vesting  period  and  expiration  date  are  obtained  from  the  annual 
reports.
15  
 The market returns are based on the Amsterdam Exchanges All-Share Index as market 
index. Since the exercises in the sample  not  only  refer  to  companies  listed  at  the  AEX, but 
also to midcap and small cap companies, we consider this index as the best proxy for measuring 
market returns. Risk-free returns are based on the daily rolling interest rates on Dutch three-
month zero discount bonds. The betas are monthly rolling betas with a 5-year moving average.  
 
 
IV. 2.  Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics on all AFM-disclosed insider purchases, sales and 
option exercises performed by between April 1999 and April 2007.   
 
– Insert Table 1 here – 
 
Panel A shows statistics on the full sample, whereas Panel B partitions transactions by 
years and by insider type. Insider purchases have the highest mean value, in contrast, they also 
have the lowest median value, suggesting considerable skewness of the distribution. The majority 
of the exercises occur between the vesting date and the expiration date (725 exercises or 62%). 
For this category the percentage of stocks sold after exercise is also the highest (90.74%). The 
mean  (median)  value  of  insider  purchases  peaked  in  2004  (1999),  while  the  largest  mean 
                                                 
15 Any exercise that occurs within 30 days of the expiration (vesting) date is considered as an exercise performed at 
expiration (vesting). For part of the sample the exact dates are unavailable and only the year of expiration (vesting) is 
known. In these cases, an exercise at expiration (vesting) is defined as any exercise that occurs in the year of 
expiration (vesting). 17 
 
(median) value for sales was calculated in 2000 (2006). For option exercises, we observe the 
highest mean (median) in 2000 (2007). Most transactions are performed by insiders who are 
neither members of the executive board nor of the supervisory board. Whereas the proportion of 
transactions for purchases and sales is approximately equal among the remaining three categories, 
the second-largest group for option exercises are, by far, members of the executive board (11%).  
Table 2 provides an overview of the anti-shareholder mechanisms used by firms in our 
sample and describes the correlation patterns between these provisions. 
 
– Insert Table 2 here – 
 
IV. 2.  Methodology 
 
We use event study methodology to identify to the gains on insider purchases, sales and option 
exercises. To understand whether the gains are due to timing, we also check the pre-transaction 
abnormal  returns  for  all  categories.  To  define  expected  returns,  we  use  the  CAPM  as  a 
benchmark:  ) ( ) ( , , , , t f t m i t f t i R R R R E - - = b  where  i b  is the covariance of the stock’s return with 
the  market  divided  by  the  variance  of  the  market  return,  t f R ,   is  the  risk-free  rate,  and 
) ( , , t f t m R R - is the market risk premium. The abnormal return is then: t i t i t i NR R AR , , , - =  











,  where  N  is  the 
number of insider option exercises in our sample. We calculate the cumulative abnormal returns 
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To determine the significance of the AARs and CAARs, we use a simple t-test, as defined 
in  e.g.  Barber  and  Lyon  (1997).  Since  the  parametric  test  may  be  sensitive  to  extreme 
observations, we also compute the nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test. Furthermore, given 
that we group the data in our univariate analysis according to some firm or insider characteristics 
and the resulting groups often contain quite few observations we also choose to use a bootstrap 
method  to  provide  further  validation  for  our  t-tests.  Under  certain  conditions,  bootstrapped 
estimators attain a faster convergence to the true value than first-order asymptotic approximations 
and  therefore  provide  refinements  to  hypothesis  testing  in  small  samples  (Horowitz  (2001)). 
Because  power  loss  may  be  severe  for  tests  at  low  significance  levels,  we  follow  the 
recommendations of Davidson and MacKinnon (1999) and run the bootstrap simulations with 
3000 repetitions. 18 
 
To  provide  further  evidence  that  the  substitution  hypothesis  explains  the  negative 
correlation between the profitability of insider transactions and the number of anti-shareholder 
devices  employed  by  the  firm,  we  use  the  2004  changes  in  Dutch  corporate  governance 
regulations as a quasi-natural experiment. As described in subsection III. 3., Dutch legislators and 
the  Committee  on  Corporate  Governance  pushed  to  mitigate  the  impact  of  anti-shareholder 
devices.  This  has  two  implications  for  our  sample  firms.  First,  there  were  companies  that 
cancelled some of their anti-shareholder devices (mostly depositary receipts). Second, even if a 
firm did not phase out any anti-shareholder mechanisms, according to the new regulations, some 
of the mechanisms became less effective in curbing shareholder rights. Both of these effects lead 
a decrease in the differences between firms in the level of shareholder-orientation and hence also 
in the level of private benefits enjoyed by insiders.  
The  substitution  hypothesis  maintains  that  insiders  concentrate  more  on  timing  their 
trades in the company’s instruments if they cannot enjoy private benefits of control. As our 
sample became more uniform in terms of the levels of private benefits after the 2004 corporate 
governance changes, according to the substitution hypothesis, the sample should also become 
more uniform in terms of the profitability of insider transactions. This means that we would 
expect to see a strong correlation between the number of anti-shareholder mechanisms and the 
profitability of insider transaction prior to 2004, but none or a weaker one afterwards. 
To investigate this, we adopt a differences-in-differences (DD) strategy. We construct a 
dummy variable for transactions that took place prior to or in 2004 and include it, as well as its 
interaction with the anti-shareholder index, in the regressions of Table 8.
16 Although the change 
in  the  corporate  governance  code  became  effective  on  January  1,  2004,  many  companies 
amended their corporate governance provisions only in or after 2005. Therefore, we repeat this 
procedure with a dummy variable for transactions before or in 2005.  
                                                 




We first conduct tests on the full sample of insider purchases, sales and option exercises, 
to analyze whether and to what extent insiders are able to time the market and gain from their 
transactions. The results are exhibited in Table 3. 
 
- Insert Table 3 here - 
 
Purchases  are  followed  by  a  significant  abnormal  stock  price  appreciation  of 
approximately 3.5%, whereas the stock price depreciates only 0.44% abnormally after a stock 
sale. Calculating the abnormal returns following the supposed announcement date (day 5), we 
find significant CARs of 2.67% and -1.14% for purchases and sales, respectively. As expected, 
purchases have higher information content than sales. When considering this evidence together 
with the stock price movements preceding these transactions, it is apparent that insiders are able 
to time their trades. Purchases are preceded by a significant share price decline of -4.55% (not 
annualized) over 40 days, whereas we discern a notable price run-up of 5.53% over the same 
period  before  sales.  The  significance  of  the  reported  results  is  confirmed  by  bootstrapped  t-
statistics.  
Next, we consider the CARs around insider purchases, sales and option exercises in sub-
samples based on the size of the firm (as measured by the logarithm of market capitalization). 
Given the distribution of our sample companies we set the cutoff value to 2bn EUR: roughly 25% 
of transactions are conducted at companies above this value. The results of this size analysis 
present no significant difference between the abnormal share price movements at small and large 
companies.
17 In Tables 4 and 5 we assess whether abnormal share price performance around 
insider transactions differs by the role the insider assumes at the company.  
 
- Insert Tables 4 and 5 here - 
 
Table 4 shows that insiders in all categories earn significantly positive abnormal returns 
during the 40 trading days following their stock purchases. Whilst we observe a marked negative 
CAAR  of  over  -10%  following  CEO  sales,  CARs  for  the  other  categories  of  insiders  lack 
statistical significance. The CAAR of almost -11% preceding CEO purchases, followed by a 
CAAR  of  some  +5%  suggests  that  chief  executives  use  their  superior  information  to  time 
                                                 
17 Table available upon request.  20 
 
transactions  in  the  company’s  stock.  It  is  particularly  striking  that  the  positive  and  negative 
CAARs before and after CEO sales are almost identical in their absolute magnitudes.  
The comparison tests reported in Table 5 confirm that the share price decline preceding 
CEOs’ purchases is significantly deeper, suggesting superior timing. In contrast, the differences 
in CARs around purchases of other groups are negligible. CEOs’ stock sales are followed by 
significantly larger abnormal declines in the stock price when compared to other categories of 
insiders. When comparing the sales of supervisory board members and executive board members 
we find that that CAARs are significantly lower following sales of the former group. 
Customarily, option packages granted to employees have a vesting period of some years, 
during which the options cannot be exercised. Insiders may regard their option packages as part 
of their normal compensation package and exercise the options as soon as they vest to satisfy 
their liquidity needs. In these cases, they are unable to adjust the time of the option exercise to the 
firm’s share price, therefore we expect that positive CARs are smaller in absolute value preceding 
option exercises at the vesting. Investors who observe that an exercise took place immediately at 
vesting would not consider this transaction to have been triggered by private information. Thus, 
we only expect that exercises after the vesting date contain private information and hence are 
followed by a negative CAR. In our sample, 228 of the option exercises in our sample occur at 
vesting, whilst the majority, 937 occur after vesting.  
We further partition the latter group into exercises that took place at, or closely before the 
option packages lapse (215 observations), and exercises neither at vesting nor at expiration, but 
between the two dates (737 observations). As the expiration date approaches, a rational investor 
would always exercise option packages, because they are worthless after they expire. Given that 
the expiration date of the option grant is also a fixed date, just as the vesting date, we expect that 
the CARs following option exercises will not be different from zero. Also, the abnormal share 
price  run-up  should  be  less  steep  preceding  exercises  at  expiration.  Finally,  we  expect 
significantly positive (negative) CARs preceding (following) option exercises between vesting 
and expiration, and the magnitude of CARs in this group to be larger than for option exercises at 
vesting or at expiration. 
 
– Insert Table 6 here – 
 
Our findings, presented in Table 6 confirm that abnormal returns prior to option exercises 
are highest for transactions between the vesting and expiration dates. The CAAR of this group 
equals  9.64%,  significantly  greater  than  (approximately  twice  the  magnitude  of)  the  options 
exercised at expiration. Although the share price run-up of this group is also larger than that of 
the options exercised at vesting, the difference is statistically insignificant. However, over the 21 
 
four-day window following the option exercise, we discern a significant negative reaction to 
exercises taking place between vesting and expiration. This negative CAR is significantly lower 
than the (positive) CAR calculated for exercises immediately after vesting. Therefore, we find 
some evidence that option exercises that are the most likely to have been triggered by private 
information are followed by negative CARs. 
Insiders’ timing of the transaction, however, may also be driven by whether the shares 
were sold after an option exercise. Shares are fully sold following the overwhelming majority 
(1,179 out of 1,392) of option exercises in our sample. Nonetheless, in untabulated results, we 
verify that pre-exercise positive CARs are significantly higher and the post-transaction CARs are 
significantly  more  negative  for  option  exercises  after  which  the  obtained  shares  are  sold,  as 
opposed to when they are retained (174 observations).  
Lastly,  we  scrutinize  how  anti-shareholder  mechanisms  (described  in  Section  IV) 
influence the CARs around insider purchases, sales and option exercises. Table 7 presents CARs 
around purchases grouped by the presence of the four main anti-shareholder mechanisms. A 
maximum of three measures may be present because firms are forbidden to employ preference 
shares, priority shares, and depository receipts simultaneously. 
 
- Insert Table 7 here - 
 
Panel  A  of  Table  7  examines  the  impact  of  anti-shareholder  mechanisms  around 
purchases. We find no disparity between firms with and without preference shares in terms of the 
share price decline prior to the purchase.  When we split our sample based on the use of priority 
shares, we find considerably smaller abnormal movements in the share price at companies which 
use  these  defensive  securities.  CARs  before  a  purchase  are  indistinguishable  from  zero  at 
companies with priority shares, whilst the price drops 7.7% over the 40 days before the purchase 
at firms without this anti-shareholder measure. Moreover, following purchases, CARs over a 
period  of  two  months  subsequent  to  the  transaction  (day  0)  or  announcement  (day  5)  are 
approximately two times larger at firms with no priority shares, providing further evidence of 
more  accurate  timing  by  insiders.  As  both  the  pre-  and  the  post-transaction  share  price 
movements  are  more  pronounced  at  firms  with  no  priority  shares,  the  data  support  the 
substitution hypothesis. Purchases are timed more accurately at firms where insiders are unable to 
curtail shareholder rights as there are no priority shares which would allow them to decide on e.g. 
the composition of the supervisory board and the executive board by themselves. Conversely, the 
timing of purchases is less accurate at firms where insiders can effectively bypass shareholders in 
numerous decisions  and  can  thus use the  company’s  assets  for goals other  than  maximizing 
shareholder value. 22 
 
Partitioning the observations according to the presence of the structured regime yields 
similar results: both pre- and post-event abnormal share price movements are substantially larger 
in absolute value if shareholder power is not diminished by the adoption of the structured regime. 
The insiders of companies without the structured regime on average purchase shares when the 
abnormal return had declined by 10.4%, which is a much larger decrease than for companies that 
impose the structured regime (-2.5%). During the 35 days following the announcement date of 
the purchase (day 5), the abnormal rise in the stock price is in excess of 5% for firms without the 
structured regime as opposed to 2% at firms that apply this anti-shareholder mechanism. CARs 
following the event as well as the announcement are comparable in magnitude for the subsamples 
of firms with and without depository receipts.
18  
Finally,  we  examine  the  disparities  between  trades  at  firms  employing  three  anti-
shareholder mechanisms (the regulatory maximum) and at those that have no such measures in 
place. Abnormal losses in the 40 days leading up to the exercise are much more severe for 
companies  without  anti-shareholder  mechanisms.  In  contrast,  firms  using  three  or  no  anti-
shareholder mechanisms do not differ significantly in terms of the post-purchase CARs. The 
results thus far suggest that the absence of anti-shareholder mechanisms magnifies the absolute 
values  of  both  the  CARs  preceding  and  following  insider  purchases.  This  pattern  of  CARs 
supports our substitution hypothesis, whereas it casts doubt on the validity of the monitoring 
hypothesis.  We now perform identical tests on sales (Table 7, Panel B) and option exercises 
(Panel C). 
The first part of Panel B shows CARs around insider sales at firms with and without 
preference shares. The share price run-up before the sale is notably sharper in the absence of 
preference shares (11.75%), as is the subsequent decline, irrespective of whether the CARs are 
measured from the transaction date [0,40] or the supposed reporting date [5,40]. We observe 
similar patterns for the structured regime and priority shares. For both categories, we see that 
CARs following sales are again distinct in the two subgroups: they are negative for companies 
that employ no priority shares but positive for their peers that do. Partitioning the sample based 
on the structured regime produces largely similar results. Also, when splitting the sample based 
on  the  presence  of  depositary  receipts,  we  find  that  CARs  after  sales  are  more  negative  at 
companies  that  do  not  use  this  instrument  to  lessen  shareholder  rights.  The  difference  is 
significant at the 1% level. Hence, these univariate results for the subsample of stock sales are in 
favor of the substitution hypothesis. 
                                                 
18 Nonetheless, we note that the reaction appears to be delayed as significantly positive abnormal returns are realized 
over the 5 days after the purchase at companies without depository receipts, whereas a CAR of similar magnitude is 
observed only after the announcement of the trade at firms that have this defense mechanism in place. 23 
 
Finally,  we  investigate  the  CARs  at  firms  with  an  intensive  use  of  anti-shareholder 
mechanisms  and  those  without.  Consistent  with  results  on  the  individual  anti-shareholder 
mechanisms,  the  abnormal  share  price  appreciation  is  significantly  larger  (10.9%)  at  firms 
lacking all anti-shareholder mechanisms. Abnormal stock price patterns after (the announcement 
of) the sale differ significantly: while CARs are positive following sales at firms with all possible 
anti-shareholder mechanisms, they are negative at their counterparts that refrain from installing 
such devices. 
Panel C shows the results on the sample of option exercises. In general, we find that the 
abnormal share price appreciation is significantly greater for option exercises at firms that do not 
employ a specific anti-shareholder mechanism. Moreover, pre-event CARs are approximately 
twice as large for firms that do not employ preference shares or priority shares, respectively, 
compared to their counterparts that do. The difference in the abnormal share price appreciation is 
four-fold  between  firms  with  all  possible  anti-shareholder  mechanisms  and  without  any. 
However,  CARs  following  option  exercises  do  not  exhibit  significant  differences  between 
subgroups. Therefore, to the extent that pre-transaction CARs are indicative of insiders’ trading 
strategies, the data on option exercises provide some support for the substitution hypothesis.  
Taken  together,  these  results  suggest  that  the  lack  of  anti-shareholder  mechanisms  is 
associated with more careful timing of insiders’ transactions. Even though these patterns appear 
to be robust in a univariate setting, given the correlation between anti-shareholder mechanisms 
and other firm characteristics such as size, profitability or ownership structure as well as the 
association amongst the anti-shareholder mechanisms themselves, we further analyze the role of 
anti-shareholder mechanisms in a multivariate framework. We use the post-transaction CARs a 
dependent variable. We consider event windows of forty days. In Tables 8, 9 and 10 we regress 
CAR[0,40] for insider purchases, sales and option exercises, respectively, on an index counting 
the number of anti-shareholder devices at the firm (ranging from 0 to 3) and numerous controls. 
The first column shows a simple OLS regression, without controls. In the second column we 
include firm fixed effects, so that the coefficient on the anti-shareholder index is identified only 
by firms that change the number of anti-shareholder mechanisms. The third column exhibits 
differences-in-differences  estimates,  using  the  2004  changes  in  corporate  governance  as  an 
exogenous shock to the number of anti-shareholder mechanisms. In the fourth and fifth columns 
we re-estimate the specifications of the first and third columns, respectively, using an extensive 
set of controls. Control variables include the position of the insider at the firm, company size, 
profitability, leverage, the identity of the largest blockholder, and dummy variables capturing the 
macroeconomic trend. For option exercises, we also control for exercise at or prior to expiration 
and the retention or sale of the obtained shares. 
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- Insert Table 8 here - 
 
Departing  from  the  full  sample  average  CAR[0,40]  of  3.46%,  our  within-firm 
specifications show that when the number of anti-shareholder mechanisms was reduced at a firm, 
the  CAR  becomes  significantly  higher,  on  average  by  2.21%  for  each  anti-shareholder 
mechanism.  DD  estimates  buttress  this  finding,  with  a  coefficient  of  similar  magnitude, 
significant at the 1% level. The DD regression reveals also that, consistent with our conjecture, 
the  number  of  anti-shareholder  mechanisms  had  no  impact  on  the  CARs  after  the  corporate 
governance changes of 2004. Thus, the number of anti-shareholder mechanisms is not merely 
correlated with the returns to insider trading, but we also have suggestive evidence to argue the 
direction of causality.  
The  inclusion  of  control  variables  in  both  the  basic  OLS  regression  and  the  DD 
specification yields coefficients that are not only similar to those found without controls but are 
to each other (-2.25% for OLS and -2.88% for DD). Moreover, coefficients are significant at the 
1% level in both extended regressions. Taken together, when including control variables, we find 
equally strong empirical support for the substitution hypothesis. Furthermore, results from the 
DD approach indicate that it is the number of anti-shareholder mechanisms that influences the 
CARs following insider purchases and not conversely. Moreover, coefficients are also significant 
economically, an issue which we return to in Section VI.  
Coefficients on other covariates indicate that insider type affects the extent to which the 
share price movements favor the insider. Holding other factors constant, CARs are significantly 
lower following purchases of supervisory board members compared to those of CEOs and other 
types of insiders. As our base category contains widely-held firms (with no entity owning 5% or 
more), we also conclude that CARs following purchases are significantly higher if either the 
government or an industrial or commercial company holds a substantial stake in the firm. The 
latter finding is difficult to square with the idea of blockholder monitoring, hence it goes against 
the monitoring hypothesis but is consistent with the substitution hypothesis. 
Firm  size  appears  to  be  positively  related  to  post-purchase  CARs,  contradicting  the 
conjecture  that  investors  have  more  information  about  large  firms  in  general.  CARs  after 
purchases appear to decrease with leverage. To the extent that high leverage is a symptom of 
financial distress and the firm underperforms, we would indeed expect there to be fewer stock 
price movements that managers can exploit. Abnormal share price patterns after insider purchases 
are not influenced by the overall trend in the economy.
19,20 
                                                 
19 Results are unaffected by exchanging the economic trend variables with year fixed effects.  
20 We infer that the overall situation of the economy is irrelevant to the abnormal returns after insider trades. An 
alternative explanation could be that since 2003 the effectiveness of timing by insiders declined. Most notably, 25 
 
Table 9 shows results from the same five regression specifications on the 40-day CAR 
following  insider  sales.  The  baseline  OLS  regression  suggests  that  following  insider  sales, 
CAR[0,40] is significantly positively related to the number of anti-shareholder mechanisms at the 
firm. After controlling for firm fixed effects, the point estimate of the coefficient is comparable to 
that  found in the OLS setting  and is once again significant at  the 1%  level, suggesting that 
whenever a firm reduced the number of anti-shareholder mechanisms, CARs following insider 
sales become more negative. The relationship is still significant with a coefficient of roughly 2 
even after including control variables. In sum, the regression results on the subsample of sales 
provide further support for the substitution hypothesis.  
 
− Insert Table 9 here − 
 
DD  estimates  lack  statistical  significance,  most  likely  because  the  full  sample 
CAAR[0,40] for sales is much smaller in absolute value than for purchases, a result that has been 
long recognized in the literature. The smaller size of post-sales CARs renders it more difficult to 
accurately  identify  drivers  of  cross-sectional  or  time-series  variation,  as  evidenced  by  the 
substantially lower goodness-of-fit values. Further empirical evidence of this pattern is provided 
by the coefficients on the control variables, of which only two appear to be significant. Firstly, 
CARs are more negative after stock sales by CEOs, which suggests that chief executives have 
superior information about the firm’s prospects. Secondly, CARs are less negative for insider 
sales at large firms. 
When scrutinizing CARs following option exercises, in Table 10, consistent correlation 
patterns are hard to ascertain. This is unsurprising as option exercises may be driven by reasons 
other than private information. Accordingly, and in contrast to stock transactions, it is actually the 
macroeconomic trend that emerges as a significant driver of CARs after option exercises. CARs 
are significantly more positive during the economic upturn through September 2000, and more 
negative during the subsequent decline, which ended in early 2003. The magnitude of the effect 
of  the  macroeconomic  cycle  appears  to  be  symmetrical  during  these  periods,  approximately 
4.25%.  
− Insert Table 10 here − 
 
Although the coefficient on the number of anti-shareholder mechanisms is positive in 
three  out  of  five  specifications  and  significant  in  the  DD  regression  without  controls  (third 
                                                                                                                                                              
changes to insider trading regulations and disclosure rules in 2002 and 2006, respectively, may have had an impact 
on  timing.  However,  when  using  year  fixed  effects,  as  discussed  in  footnote  25,  we  find  no  evidence  of  this, 
furthermore, a priori, we would expect these changes to have had an impact also on sales and option exercises. 26 
 
column),  it  is  unclear  whether  the  substitution  hypothesis  holds  also  in  the  case  of  option 
exercises. If these transactions are not driven by private information, then our findings regarding 
substitution  of  private  benefits  and  insider  trading  profits  should  indeed  be  limited. 
Notwithstanding, we again provide evidence that blockholder monitoring by the government is 
quite ineffective: CARs are substantially more negative at firms where the government has the 
largest stake. Lastly, there is some support for the conjecture that option exercises occurring at 
vesting are followed by less negative abnormal returns. Although Tables 8, 9 and 10 report only 
conventional  t-statistics,  our  results  are  virtually  unaltered  when  using  t-statistics  based  on 
bootstrapped standard errors. 
Previously  we  have  shown  that  significant  negative  CARs  precede  insiders’  stock 
purchases and there is a sizeable abnormal share price run-up before their stock sales and option 
exercises. In supplementary analysis, we reveal that, in addition to post-transaction CARs, these 
pre-transaction abnormal stock price movements are also significantly correlated with the number 
of anti-shareholder mechanisms. In Tables 11, 12 and 13 of the Appendix, we tabulate the same 
regression specifications as in Table 8, 9 and 10, with the dependent variable is CAR[-40,-1]. The 
results of these regressions are quite similar to our findings on the post-transaction CARs: the 
more anti-shareholder mechanisms a firm has, the smaller the abnormal share price movement 
that favors the insider. DD estimates with and without controls also produce significant results, 
suggesting that it is indeed firm-specific governance rules that influence CARs preceding insider 
transactions.  
Lastly, in Tables 14 and 15 of the Appendix, we use a measure which combines pre-and 
post-transaction abnormal returns to more accurately detect the incidence of trading on private 
information. We construct this variable by dividing the gross cumulative abnormal return over 
the event window following the transaction by the gross cumulative abnormal return over the 
event window preceding the transaction. We then take the natural logarithm of this ratio, thereby 
obtaining a variable which is expected to be positive for purchases (where the stock price first 
declines  then  recovers,  depicting  a  “V”  shaped  pattern)  and  negative  for  sales  and  option 
exercises  (where  the  price  peaks  around  the  transaction  and  declines  afterwards).  Thus  the 
dependent variable in our regressions is                                             where ￿ is the length of the 
two event windows (by construction, the pre-event window is always a day shorter).
21 Table 14 
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exhibits OLS specifications with control variables, whereas Table 15 shows DD regressions. 
Again, results are consistently in favor of the substitution hypothesis.
22 
Overall, the regression models reinforce the results of our univariate analysis and suggest 
that at firms with a lower number of anti-shareholder mechanisms insider purchases entail more 
positive CARs, whereas sales and option exercises at such firms entail more negative CARs. 
Moreover, we reveal that the presence of blockholders is associated with more accurate timing by 
insiders, not less. In line with our expectations and previous literature, results are marked for 
stock purchases, which are most likely to be based on private information, and somewhat less 
pronounced for sales and option exercises. Hence, the findings of our multivariate analysis also 
corroborate the substitution hypothesis and go against the monitoring hypothesis.  
 
 
V. 1. Robustness checks 
 
To  eliminate  possible  sources  of  spurious  correlation,  we  subject  our  results  to  four  further 
robustness checks. 
 
Transactions in months of frequent trading 
 
We examine whether the detected relationship between insider trading, option exercises 
and corporate governance is driven by transactions in months when the majority of insiders was 
purchasing (selling) the stock or when there were a large number of insiders exercising their 
option  packages.  We  define  a  high  net  purchase  month  as  any  month  in  which  purchases 
outnumbered sales by ten or more. High net sale months are defined similarly. Lastly, we order 
months by the number of option exercises that took place and label the top decile as high option 
exercise months. We then re-estimate the regressions shown in Tables 8, 9 and 10 and add the 
corresponding binary variable for high net purchase months, high net sale months or high option 
exercise months to the regressions that feature control variables. Compared to the baseline results 
reported in the fourth and fifth columns of Tables 8, 9 and 10 this procedure yields quantitatively 
similar coefficient estimates and identical significance levels.
23 Therefore, we are reassured that 
                                                 
22 To ensure the robustness of results to the choice of the event window, in untablulated regressions we confirm that 
our predictions are qualitatively similar when using lnR(20). Results are even stronger if we use a modified version 
of lnR(40), where the post-event gross CAR is calculated over the window [5;40] so that it spans a period where the 
transaction is revealed to all investors. 
23 Results are available upon request. 28 
 
that our main results hold equally in periods of intensive insider purchasing, selling and option 
exercising. 
 
Clustering of option exercises 
 
To ascertain the robustness of our findings on option exercises, we delve into exercises by 
insiders at the same company. Thus far, we have argued that insiders are able to time their option 
exercises to the market, realizing a significant abnormal return on the transaction. If this is the 
case, then it is also plausible that more insiders at a given firm take advantage of the favorable 
price movements. Hence, exercises may occur in groups rather than in a random fashion over 
time. When more insiders of the same company exercise their option packages on the same day, 
the signal sent to the market is clearer. Furthermore, there are no complications in identifying the 
event day and no overlapping event windows. Although we initially find that multiple insider 
exercises are timed more carefully than standalone transactions, this difference vanishes once we 






One possible mechanism that may explain the difference between the CARs following 
insider transactions is that firms with strong corporate governance are more transparent. Thus, 
shareholders have more information based on which they can adjust their valuation of the stock 
price. It follows that insider transactions do not carry much additional information. By contrast, 
firms with weak governance are informationally opaque, therefore insider transactions should be 
more informative. If this were the case, we would expect to see more sizable CARs after insider 
purchases  at  firms  with  weak  corporate  governance  (high  number  of  anti-shareholder 
mechanisms) than at firms with strong governance (few or no anti-shareholder mechanisms). 
However,  we  observe  exactly  the  opposite  in  our  data:  the  number  of  anti-shareholder 
mechanisms is negatively related to CARs following purchases, not positively (and positively, 
not negatively to the CARs following sales).  
Notwithstanding, we choose to examine empirically whether informational opaqueness 
can, in part, explain our results. To this end, we gather information on earnings announcements 
and use changes in stock price volatility around these events to capture informational opaqueness. 
Our proxy is defined as the percentage change in the 10-day realized stock return volatility before 
                                                 
24 Tables are available upon request. 29 
 
and after the earnings announcement. To eliminate idiosyncratic effects, we consider three-year 
moving averages of this measure by averaging over all earnings announcements in a given year, 
the previous year and the following year. We then add this proxy to the regressions in the fourth 
(OLS with controls) and fifth (DD with controls) columns of Tables 8, 9 and 10. We find that the 
change in volatility around earnings announcements does not enter significantly in any of the 
regressions. We conclude that informational opaqueness cannot explain the variation in CARs 




One further concern regarding the interpretation of our results is that investors may be 
reluctant to hold and trade in stocks of firms with a high number of anti-shareholder mechanisms. 
If this were the case, the anti-shareholder index used in our regressions would not only proxy for 
the strength of corporate governance at the firm level, but also for the liquidity of the stock. To 
distinguish between our explanation and one based on liquidity, we consider the turnover of the 
stock over the one-year period preceding the insider transaction, expressed in percentage terms. 
We include this variable in the regressions in the fourth (OLS with controls) and fifth (DD with 
controls) columns of Tables 8, 9 and 10. Our results (untabulated) indicate that although turnover 
is significantly correlated with post-event CARs in the case of purchases and option exercises, 
coefficient estimates and significance levels for the anti-shareholder index are unchanged by the 
inclusion of this control variable. 
 
VI. Estimating the value of private benefits 
 
In Section V, we have shown that CARs are higher after insider purchases and lower 
following sales and option exercises at firms that employ fewer anti-shareholder mechanisms or 
employ  none  at  all.  We  argue  in  our  substitution  hypothesis  that  the  reason  underlying  this 
pattern  is  that  insiders  of  firms  protected  by  anti-shareholder  mechanisms  enjoy  substantial 
private benefits of control. The empirical support this hypothesis receives in our dataset suggests 
that  these  benefits  of  entrenchment,  both  monetary  and  nonmonetary,  may  outweigh  the 
prospective gains from insider trading. Therefore, CARs following insider transaction will favor 
the insider to a lesser extent at firms where they are ensured a powerful position owing to anti-
shareholder mechanisms. However, at corporations where shareholder rights are not suppressed 
and the degree of entrenchment is thus small, they may resort to legal insider trading to still 
exploit their position. In line with previous literature, we have established that CARs have the 30 
 
largest absolute value following insider purchases, as sales and option exercises may take place 
for liquidity and other reasons. 
Hence,  the  value  of  an  anti-shareholder  mechanism  can  be  approximated  by  the 
coefficient estimates on the anti-shareholder index in our regressions of CAR[0,40] following 
insider purchases, as these express the average incremental gains to insider trading at companies 
that have one anti-shareholder mechanism fewer.
25 We base our estimates on the coefficient in 
the  fourth  column  of  Table  8,  although  point  estimates  are  remarkably  similar  across 
specifications.  The hypothetical increment in profits due to the change in CARs is calculated as 
pq b , where p is the observed market price of the shares on the day the transaction took place, q 
is the number of shares purchased and b is the regression coefficient on the anti-shareholder 
index in the regression of CAR[0,40]. Because abolishing one anti-shareholder mechanism at a 
firm would, on average, lead to an increment in insider trading profits, we interpret these profits 
as  the  value  of  the  anti-shareholder  mechanism.  Alternatively,  if  the  firm  had  one  anti-
shareholder mechanism more, insiders would be able to consume more private benefits of control 
and would therefore devote less attention to their trades in the company’s stock. Our regressions 
predict that this would shrink their profits from insider trading by  pq b . Finally, we take the 
average of the estimates for the individual transactions.When performing the estimation for the 
subsample of stock purchases, this procedure yields an annual average value of €13,397. We 
interpret this as the average value of entrenchment that is due to one anti-shareholder mechanism.  
We underline that this is a rather conservative estimate and that it refers to the value of 
one anti-shareholder mechanism. As seen in Table 2 the majority of our sample firms employs 
two or more anti-shareholder mechanisms, thereby creating a greater degree of entrenchment 
which,  according  to  our  estimation  procedure,  would  double  or  treble  the  value  of  private 
benefits. Moreover, our estimate is based on single transactions of individual insiders. Insiders 
can  repeatedly  trade  in  the  firm’s  stock,  which  suggests  that  the  longer  the  anti-shareholder 
mechanisms remain installed, the more valuable they are. Furthermore, an insider may purchase 
(and sell company) stock frequently within the span of one (business) year. Lastly, insiders of the 
same  firm  collectively  enjoy  benefits  of  control  stemming  from  entrenchment,  therefore  one 
could also valuate these benefits as the sum of incremental gains from insider trading realized by 
all  insiders  of  a  firm,  or,  at  the  very  least  the  CEO  and  the  board  of  directors.  These 
considerations underscore that the approximation of the value of entrenchment presented in this 
paper renders a conservative estimate, which is a lower bound for the value of entrenchment. We 
consider the total value of entrenchment over our sample period of ten years at a firm which is 
                                                 
25 By using the number of anti-shareholder mechanisms, we proxy for the value of the private benefits as there is no 
one-to-one relation between the consumption of private benefits and the reduction of insider trading. As we have 
argued before, they are not perfect substitutes. 31 
 
average according to all measures in our sample. This means that the firm employs two anti-
shareholder mechanisms (the sample average and median, as reported in Table 2) and the firm’s 
insiders perform the sample average number of purchases (calculated as the total number of 
purchases, divided by the number of firms in the purchase subsample, reported in Panel A of 
Table 1). Then, throughout our sample of ten years, each of the two anti-shareholder mechanisms 
would be worth €98,669 to these corporate insiders, hence the total value of entrenchment at the 
average firm in our sample (which has two anti-shareholder devices) would equal €197,338. 
Moreover, based on our estimation procedure, employing the regulatory maximum of 3 anti-
shareholder devices results in entrenchment benefits of €296,007.
26 
There are two caveats to this interpretation. The first is that these results are predicated on 
the assumption that the relationship between the number of anti-shareholder mechanisms and the 
CARs following insider purchases is linear. As our dependent variable is essentially a residual, 
including higher-order terms may be demanding of the data, or lead us to overfit the regressions 
in-sample. The second caveat is that if substitution between profitable insider trading and private 
benefits of control ceased after the 2004 corporate governance changes, then we should not use 
data from 2005 onwards to estimate the magnitude of private benefits. The DD specifications in 
the third and fifth columns of Table 8 confirm that regression coefficients were higher for the 
period 1999-2004, therefore, our estimates on the value of an anti-shareholder mechanism to one 
insider would also be higher. Once again, these results underline the conservative nature of our 






Insiders of publicly listed firms possess more information about the company than outside 
shareholders. This informational advantage can be converted into profits through insider trading, 
illegal or legal. This paper studies insider trading and option exercises, and establishes their 
connection to several aspects of corporate governance: governance rules (as measured by the 
anti-shareholder mechanisms) and blockholder concentration. We examine a sample of insider 
                                                 





B a * * , where a is the number of anti-shareholder devices employed, 
nbuy is the total number of transactions in a subsample (purchases, sales, options), fbuy is the number of firms in the 
subsample, the fraction is the average number of transactions at a firm over our sample period and Bbuy is the benefit 
calculated in the previous step, equal to  pq b . 32 
 
trades  and  option  exercises  at  listed  firms  in  the  Netherlands,  a  financial  market  where 
shareholder rights are significantly restrained through several anti-shareholder mechanisms. The 
most widely used anti-shareholder devices are the structured regime, priority shares, preference 
shares and depositary receipts 
Our results show that insiders earn a cumulative abnormal return of 3.46% following 
purchases, however, the price does not move in their favor following stock sales and option 
exercises. To better understand if these returns are due to timing or simply purchasing after the 
stock has been appreciating for a certain period, we also look at abnormal returns preceding 
insider transactions. We discern a 5% abnormal depreciation of the share price over the 40-day 
window before purchases. We also observe a similar appreciation before sales, and an abnormal 
climb in excess of 8% prior to option exercises. Our analysis reveals also that abnormal share 
price appreciation after CEO purchases is roughly 5%, whereas the abnormal loss following a 
CEO stock sale is in excess of -10%. In line with an information hierarchy among insiders, 
abnormal  stock  price  movements  are  less  sharp  following  transactions  of  executive  board 
members other than the CEO, supervisory board members and other insiders.  
We  shed  new  light  on  the  interrelationship  between  insider  trading  and  corporate 
governance by assessing how anti-shareholder mechanisms such as preference shares, priority 
shares, depository receipts, and the structured regime influence abnormal stock price patterns 
around insider trading and option exercises. Our baseline hypothesis on this relationship is the 
monitoring hypothesis, which asserts that the absence of anti-shareholder devices leads to greater 
shareholder awareness, which curtails insider trading. Based on this argument, insider trading 
should  be  more  profitable  at  companies  employing  many  anti-shareholder  mechanisms.  The 
alternative,  the  substitution  hypothesis  posits  that  private  benefits  of  control  owed  to  anti-
shareholder mechanisms are larger than potential profits to insider trading. Therefore, insiders are 
likely to seek trading profits if they cannot exploit private benefits, implying larger profits to 
insider trading at firms with fewer anti-shareholder devices. We provide compelling evidence that 
the absolute value of abnormal returns following insider transactions is higher at firms that do not 
limit shareholder rights by employing anti-shareholder mechanisms. The findings are strongest 
for insider purchases, consistent with the notion supported by previous empirical work that sales 
may be motivated by liquidity or diversification motives.  
The paper contributes to the extant literature on insider trading and corporate governance 
by  alleviating  concerns  of  endogeneity  and  addressing  the  causal  relationship  between 
governance  rules  and  insider  trading  profits.  To  accomplish  this,  we  adopt  a  differences-in-
differences approach which uses the 2004 changes in Dutch corporate governance regulations as 
quasi-natural experiment which shifts corporate governance rules. Our findings indicate that as 33 
 
firms did away with shareholder-unfriendly governance structures, profits to insider purchases 
did indeed increase. 
These results are unanimously in the favor of our substitution hypothesis and suggest that 
corporate insiders are more inclined to make profits on trades in the shares of their company if 
they do not (or to a lesser extent) enjoy private benefits stemming from weak shareholder rights. 
In contrast, we observe that insiders at companies with several anti-shareholder mechanisms earn 
significantly  lower  abnormal  returns  following  their  trades.  From  this,  we  infer  that  private 
benefits of control outweigh the returns to insider trading and option exercising if management is 
heavily entrenched. However, if anti-shareholder devices do not impede shareholder participation 
in  company  decisions,  insiders  cannot  (or  to  a  lesser  extent)  attain  private  benefits  and  will 
substitute them with profitable insider trading. The most likely reason our results differ from 
those  of  previous  studies  is  that  the  variation  in  shareholder  rights  is  much  larger  in  the 
Netherlands than in the US or the UK, simply because the range extends much further at the end 
of low shareholder rights. Indeed, even in the early ‘90s some US shareholders were shocked to 
discover that they are completely powerless at their Dutch investee firms, with voting with their 
feet being their only option. 
The  substitution  effect  uncovered  in  this  paper  allows  for  the  measurement  of  the 
monetary value of entrenchment provided by anti-shareholder mechanisms.  Using an extensive 
set of control variables we find that the relationship between anti-shareholder devices and profits 
to  insider  purchases  remains  significant  both  statistically  and  economically.  Based  on  our 
regression analysis, our conservative estimate for private benefits is approximately €13,397 for 
share  purchases  per  year,  per  anti-shareholder  mechanism.  Based  on  the  number  of  insider 
purchases and anti-shareholder mechanisms at our sample firms, the average company’s insiders 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A reports statistics for the full sample. The sample is partitioned by exercise time (early, at expiration, on or after the vesting date). An early exercise is 
defined as an exercise with more than 30 days to expiration, when the exact expiration dates are known. When the exact dates are unknown and only the year of 
expiration (vesting) is available, an exercise at expiration is defined as any exercise that occurs in the year of expiration (vesting). Of the 1,392 exercises, 211 
(226) do not report an exact expiration (vesting) date. In Panel A the word "transaction" refers to option exercises, insider sales and insider purchases. Mean value 
of options exercised is measured as the number of options exercised times the stock' s closing price on the exercise date. Transaction values are quoted in Euros. 
Panel B reports statistics for the sample partitioned by transaction year and type of insider. The 4 categories of insiders are CEOs, executive board members 
excluding the CEO, supervisory board and other insiders. Other insiders include large shareholders, the management board and supervisory board of companies in 
which the company has an interest of at least 10%, partners and first degree relatives of CEOs, executive board members and supervisory board members that live 
in the same household, first degree relatives of CEOs, executive board members and supervisory board members that do not live in the same household, but have 
an equity stake of at least 5% in the company and members of the works council. Data are from the period 1999-2007. 
                           
Panel A: Summary Statistics for the full sample of insider sales, purchases and option exercises 
      Number of   Number of   Number of   Transaction value  Mean (median) % of 
stocks sold 
Mean (median) years prior 
to expiration        exercises  firms  insiders  mean  median 
                       
Option exercises  1,392  79  733  169,358  47,120  86.45  100  2.17  1.83 
                   
Exercised on 
vesting date  228  35  156  196,276  100,561  87.91  100  3.88  3.75 
Exercised before 
expiration and 
after vesting date  725  59  448  175,320  47,412  90.74  100  2.22  1.83 
Exercised at 
expiration   220  27  143  110,609  24,547  84.55  100          -       - 
                               
Insider 
purchases  663  90  339  595,437  20,113                 





Table 1 - continued 
Panel B: Summary Statistics by calendar years and insider type 
  Number of Number of  Number of   Value of purchases  Value of sales 
Value of options 
exercised  Option exercises 
 
purchases  sales  option exercises  mean   median  mean  median  mean  median  % of stocks sold  Years prior to 
expiration 
                              mean  median  mean  median 
                                         
Full Sample  663  739  1,392  595,437  20,113  438,618  63,000  169,358  47,120  86.45  100  2.17  1.83 
                           
1999  69  83  109  386,835  59,000  358,050  57,532  109,925  37,800  79.29  100  2.11  2.33 
2000  132  122  248  465,159  25,003  711,075  80,300  325,483  68,666  88.03  100  2.25  2.08 
2001  122  96  211  459,078  17,370  436,635  64,500  145,242  28,680  87.96  100  1.53  1.00 
2002  89  88  99  278,754  19,891  693,811  90,502  145,860  38,540  80.42  100  0.86  0.75 
2003  43  53  62  217,329  11,291  257,411  52,200  211,797  24,031  72.58  100  0.91  0 
2004  60  77  106  2,810,560  22,175  91,900  40,250  74,449  24,062  87.86  100  2.18  1.17 
2005  41  76  158  666,459  13,500  198,521  44,007  73,034  31,231  86.69  100  2.51  1.75 
2006  82  81  312  243,000  17,323  394,492  156,340  151,434  83,240  89.09  100  2.71  2.00 
2007  25  63  87  13,824  6,375  583,291  48,430  205,780  120,557  93.00  100  2.58  1.25 
                           
                           








113  61  26  519,845  16,732  756,096  269,300  462,570  137,230  84.62  100  2.02  1.46 
Other 
insiders 





Table 2: Descriptive statistics and correlations for anti-shareholder mechanisms 
           
     
Number of purchases  Number of sales  Number of option 
exercises 
           
None      45  53  83 
Structured regime only    66  97  36 
Preference shares only    83  124  353 
Priority shares only    14  7  34 
Depositary receipts only  1  0  13 
Structured regime and preference shares  104  68  321 
Structured regime and priority shares  17  1  1 
Structured regime and depositary receipts  1  0  3 
Preference shares and priority shares  17  44  68 
Preference shares and depositary receipts  22  35  208 
Priority shares and depositary receipts  0  0  0 
Three anti-shareholder mechanisms  161  208  76 
           
Correlation matrix - purchases          
           
    Structured regime  Preference shares  Priority shares  Depositary receipts 
Structured regime  1  .  .  . 
Priority shares  0.0950  1  .  . 
Preference shares  0.2242  0.1304  1  . 
Depositary receipts  0.0116  0.2127  -0.2160  1 
           
           
Correlation matrix - sales          
           
    Structured regime  Preference shares  Priority shares  Depositary receipts 
Structured regime  1  .  .  . 
Priority shares  -0.0386  1  .  . 
Preference shares  0.1913  0.3109  1  . 
Depositary receipts  0.1391  0.2866  -0.1364  1 
           
           
Correlation matrix - option exercises          
           
    Structured regime  Preference shares  Priority shares  Depositary receipts 
Structured regime  1  .  .  . 
Priority shares  0.1644  1  .  . 
Preference shares  0.089  -0.0416  1  . 




Table 3: Abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns around insider purchases and sales 
This table reports the average abnormal returns around insider purchases, insider sales and option exercises for the full sample of insider purchases and sales reported to 
the AFM between April 1999 and April 2007. Abnormal returns are estimated with the CAPM, using the Amsterdam Exchanges All-Share Index as market index. 
Panel A shows the daily average abnormal returns from day 0 (the day of the trade) to day 10. Panel B reports the cumulative average abnormal returns for 6 windows 
around the event date. Day 5 is assumed to be the announcement date and CAR [0,1] covers both the transaction date and the subsequent trading day. Bootstrapped t-
statistics are calculated based on 3,000 resamplings.  ***, **, * represent two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Data are from the period 
1999-2007. 
                         
  PURCHASES  n=663     SALES  n=739  OPTION EXERCISES  n=1,392 
                         
Panel A: Abnormal returns 
Event 




window  Mean %  t-statistic 
bootstrapped t 
significance 
 Event  
window  Mean %  t-statistic 
bootstrapped 
t significance 
                                   
                         
0  0.19  1.04    0  0.55  3.04***     0  0.25       3.73***   
1  0.40  2.92***    1  0.21  1.86*     1  -0.18      -3.05***   
2  0.41  3.43***    2  -0.09  -0.91     2  0.04  0.74   
3  -0.04  -0.12    3  0.01  0.12     3  0.05  0.85   
4  -0.08  -0.62    4  0.12  1.15     4  0.05  0.89   
5  0.07  0.60    5  0.10  1.10     5  -0.01  -0.11   
6  0.19  1.47    6  -0.12  -1.12     6  0  0.04   
7  -0.09  -0.15    7  -0.08  -0.76     7  -0.12      -1.96**   
8  -0.15  -1.29    8  0.11  1.06     8  -0.06  -0.98   
9  0.14  1.19    9  -0.15  -1.66*     9  0.1  1.64   
10  -0.01  -0.08    10  -0.10  -1.33     10  0.02  0.39   
                         
Panel B: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns 
                       
[-40,-1]  -4.55  -5.33***  ***  [-40,-1]  5.53  7.08***  ***  [-40,-1]  8.34       20.36***  *** 
[0,1]  0.52  2.59***  ***  [0,1]  0.66  2.74***  ***  [0,1]  0.06  0.73   
[0,5]  0.87  3.05***  ***  [0,5]  0.81  2.82***  ***  [0,5]  0.2  1.37  * 
[0,40]  3.46  5.47***  ***  [0,40]  -0.44  -0.63    [0,40]  1.17       3.01***  *** 
[5,8]  0.16  0.72    [5,8]  0.02  0.13    [5,8]  -0.18  -1.4  * 




Table 4: Cumulative abnormal returns around insider transactions grouped by the type of insider performing the transaction 
This table reports the CAARs around insider purchases and sales, for the transactions partitioned according to the type of insider involved. The categories are: CEOs, Executive Board 
Members, Supervisory Board Members and Other Insiders with a duty to report their trade. Other insiders include large shareholders, the executive board and supervisory board of 
companies in which the company has an interest of at least 10%, partners and first degree relatives of CEOs, executive board members and supervisory board members that live in the 
same household, first degree relatives of CEOs, executive board members and supervisory board members that do not live in the same household, but have an equity stake of at least 
5% in the company and members of the workers'  council. Abnormal returns are estimated with the CAPM, using the Amsterdam Exchanges All-Share Index as market index. Day 5 is 
assumed to be the announcement date. Bootstrapped t-statistics are calculated based on 3,000 resamplings. ***, **, * represent two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. Data are from the period 1999-2007. 
Event  CAAR %  t-statistic  bootstrapped    CAAR %  t-statistic  bootstrapped    CAAR %  t-statistic  bootstrapped    CAAR %  t-statistic  bootstrapped 
window      t-statistic        t-statistic        t-statistic        t-statistic 
PURCHASES 
   CEOs (n=115)     Executive board     Supervisory board     Others (n=337) 
          members (n=98)    members (n=113)       
[-40,-1]  -10.90  -4.19***  ***    -2.99  -1.51  *    -1.23  -0.88      -3.96  3.29***  *** 
[0,1]  0.91  1.65  *    0.49  0.80      0.35  0.76      0.46  1.76*  ** 
[0,5]  0.77  0.96      1.33  1.52  *    -0.37  -0.71      1.19  3.09***  *** 
[0,40]  4.87  2.97***  ***    3.64  2.03**  **    2.46  1.98**  **    3.26  3.66***  *** 
[5,8]  0.51  0.84  .    -0.05  -0.12      -0.19  -0.52      0.22  0.64   
[5,40]  3.96  2.67***  ***    1.93  1.21      2.64  2.15**  **    2.46  2.86***  *** 
SALES 
   CEOs (n=70)     Executive board     Supervisory board     Others (n=520) 
          members (n=88)    members (n=61)       
[-40,-1]  10.20  2.58**  ***    4.51  2.24**  ***    3.68  1.15      5.28  6.36***  *** 
[0,1]  -1.25  -1.55  *    0.98  1.81*  **    0.71  1.10      0.85  2.85***  *** 
[0,5]  -1.32  -1.36  *    0.41  0.65      1.06  1.19      1.13  3.21***  *** 
[0,40]  -10.36  -3.02***  ***    1.26  0.72      -1.98  -1.13      0.79  1.00   
[5,8]  -1.16  -1.99*  *    -0.08  -0.20      0.71  1.23      0.12  0.51   
[5,40]  -9.02  -2.61**  ***    0.88  0.57      -2.23  -1.24      -0.30  -0.44   
OPTION EXERCISES 
   CEOs (n=44)     Executive board     Supervisory board     Others (n=1174) 
          members (n=148)    members (n=26)       
[-40,-1]  6.36  2.19**  **    6.4  4.55***  ***    14.31  4.31***  ***    8.53  19.73***  *** 
[0,1]  0.05  0.1      -0.21  -0.71      0.16  0.19      0.1  1.03   
[0,5]  -0.38  -0.26      0.17  0.35      1.35  1.22      0.2  1.33   
[0,40]  -0.62  -0.21      1.11  0.95      5.19  1.61      1.15  2.77***  *** 
[5,8]  -2.00  -1.50      -0.02  -0.04      1.38  1.06      -0.17  -1.26   
[5,40]  -1.00  -0.42      0.86  0.76      4.12  1.28      0.98  2.67***  ** 42 
 
Table 5: Differences in cumulative abnormal return patterns by insider type 
This  table  shows  the  results  of  two-sample  comparison  tests  between  the  means  of  cumulative 
abnormal returns before and after transactions by insiders, where the subsamples are created by insider 
type. A + (-) indicates that the CAAR for the group listed in the row, to the left, was significantly 
higher (lower) than the CAAR for the group listed in the column, at the top. The number of + (-) signs 
corresponds to the level of significance with 1, 2 and 3 signs indicating significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively. The equality of variances among the two groups was tested prior to the 
mean  comparison  test,  and  the  appropriate  version  (equal  or  unequal  variances)  of  the  mean 
comparison test was implemented. Data are from the period 1999-2007. 
               
Purchases               
    CEO  Executive board  Supervisory board 
    [-40,-1]  [5,40]  [-40,-1]  [5,40]  [-40,-1]  [5,40] 
CEO  [-40,-1]             
  [5,40]             
Executive board  [-40,-1]  + + +           
  [5,40]    n.s.         
Supervisory board  [-40,-1]  + + +    n.s.       
  [5,40]    n.s.    n.s.     
Others  [-40,-1]  + + +     n.s.    –   
  [5,40]    n.s.    n.s.    n.s. 
                       
Sales               
    CEO  Executive board  Supervisory board 
    [-40,-1]  [5,40]  [-40,-1]  [5,40]  [-40,-1]  [5,40] 
CEO  [-40,-1]             
  [5,40]             
Executive board  [-40,-1]  –           
  [5,40]    + + +         
Supervisory board  [-40,-1]  n.s.    n.s.       
  [5,40]    +    –     
Others  [-40,-1]  n.s.    n.s.    n.s.   
  [5,40]    + + +     n.s.    n.s. 
                       
Option exercises               
    CEO  Executive board  Supervisory board 
    [-40,-1]  [5,40]  [-40,-1]  [5,40]  [-40,-1]  [5,40] 
CEO  [-40,-1]             
  [5,40]             
Executive board  [-40,-1]  n.s.           
  [5,40]    n.s.         
Supervisory board  [-40,-1]  +    + +       
  [5,40]    n.s.    n.s.     
Others  [-40,-1]  n.s.    n.s.    –   












Table 6: Cumulative abnormal returns - exercises at vesting, between vesting and expiration and at expiration 
This table reports the cumulative average abnormal returns around option exercises and the corresponding t-statistics and Wilcoxon rank-sum statistics for the exercises at 
vesting, between vesting and expiration and at expiration. Abnormal returns are estimated with the CAPM-model, using the Amsterdam Exchanges All-Share Index as market 
index. These results apply to the sample of option exercises for which the vesting date is known (n=1,180). Options exercised on the vesting date are those exercised between 
zero and 30 days after the vesting date, when the exact expiration dates are known. For part of the sample only the year of vesting (expiration) is available. In these cases, an 
exercise at the vesting (expiration) date is defined as any exercise that occurs in the year of vesting (expiration). Day 5 is assumed to be the announcement date. Bootstrapped 
t-statistics are calculated based on 3,000 resamplings. ***, **, * represent the 1%, 5% and 10% two-tailed significance respectively. Data are from the period 1999-2007. 
                    
   Exercises at vesting (n=228)     Exercises between vesting      Exercises at expiration (n=215) 
          and expiration (n=737)         
Day  CAAR %  t-statistic  bootstrapped    CAAR %  t-statistic  bootstrapped    CAAR %  t-statistic  bootstrapped 
      t-statistic        t-statistic        t-statistic 
                                   
[-40,-1]  8.94  9.82***  ***    9.64  16.05***  ***    4.85  6.44***  ***. 
[0,1]  -0.14  -0.73      0.20  1.49      -0.14  -0.98   
[0,5]  0.11  0.34      0.24  1.10      0.17  0.50   
[0,40]  1.37  2.29**  **    1.02  1.76*  *    1.39  1.74*  * 
[5,8]  0.36  1.56      -0.38  -1.90*  *    -0.60  -1.90*   
[5,40]  1.63  3.01***  ***    0.62  1.24      1.13  1.59   
                       
                                   
  Difference at vesting and    Difference at vesting and    Difference between vesting and 
  between vesting and expiration    at expiration    expiration and at expiration 
                       
Day  t-statistic  bootstrapped  Wilcoxon     t-statistic  bootstrapped  Wilcoxon     t-statistic  bootstrapped  Wilcoxon  
  difference  t-statistic  Z-statistic    difference  t-statistic  Z-statistic    difference  t-statistic  Z-statistic 
      difference  difference        difference  difference        difference  difference 
[-40,-1]  -0.64    -0.98    3.46***  ***  2.26**    4.96***  ***  4.41*** 
[0,1]  -1.47  *  -1.28    0.01    -0.36    1.74*  **  0.90 
[0,5]  -0.35    -1.76*    -0.13    -1.49    0.18    0.41 
[0,40]  0.42    1.35    -0.02    1.17    -0.38    -0.44 
[5,8]  2.42**  ***  1.04    2.45**  **  1.59    0.59    0.86 
[5,40]  1.37  *  2.93***    0.56    1.86*    -0.59    -0.93 44 
 
 
Table 7: Cumulative abnormal returns around insider transactions partitioned by anti-shareholder 
mechanisms in place 
This table reports cumulative average abnormal returns around insider transactions partitioned according to anti-shareholder mechanisms 
in place at the firm. Panel A shows results for share purchases, panel B for share sales and panel C for option exercises. Abnormal returns 
are estimated with the CAPM, using the Amsterdam Exchanges All-Share Index as market index. Note that firms may not employ 
preference shares, priority shares and depository receipts at the same time, a maximum two of the three are allowed. Day 5 is assumed to 
be the announcement date. Bootstrapped t-statistics are calculated based on 3,000 resamplings. ***, **, * represent two-tailed significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Data are from the period 1999-2007. 
Panel A: Share purchases 
Event  CAAR %  t-statistic  bootstrapped    CAAR %  t-statistic  bootstrapped    t-statistic  bootstrapped  Wilcoxon  
window      t-statistic        t-statistic    difference  t-statistic  Z-statistic 
                              difference  difference 
                       
  Preference shares (n=387)    No preference shares (n=144)    Difference 
[-40,-1]  -4.94  -4.31***  ***    -6.00  -3.20***  ***    -0.48    0.59 
[0,1]  0.68  2.63***  ***    1.43  2.78***  ***    1.30  *  -0.30 
[0,5]  1.17  3.03***  ***    1.52  2.71***  ***    0.51    0.07 
[0,40]  4.93  5.40***  ***    2.67  2.44**  ***    -1.59  *  -1.53 
[5,8]  0.37  1.17      -0.33  -0.79      -1.34  *  -0.61 
[5,40]  3.95  4.54***  ***     1.02  1.09       -2.28**  **  -1.69* 
                       
  Priority shares (n=167)    No priority shares (n=364)    Difference 
[-40,-1]  0.14  0.09  .    -7.70  -6.23***  ***    -4.07***  ***  -2.45** 
[0,1]  1.31  3.58***  ***    0.69  2.31**  **    -1.31  *  -2.03** 
[0,5]  1.41  2.56**  ***    1.20  3.06***  ***    -0.31    0.10 
[0,40]  2.75  2.60**  ***    5.04  5.32***  ***    1.61  *  1.12 
[5,8]  -0.16  -0.39      0.34  1.05      0.95    1.36 
[5,40]  1.22  1.16       4.04  4.64***  ***     2.05**  **  2.08** 
                       
  Structured regime (n=349)    No structured regime (n=182)    Difference 
[-40,-1]  -2.54  -2.81***  ***    -10.40  -4.67***  ***    -3.27***  ***  -2.00** 
[0,1]  0.76  3.28***  ***    1.12  2.15**  **    0.64    -0.50 
[0,5]  1.04  3.10***  ***    1.71  2.52**  ***    0.89    0.61 
[0,40]  2.77  3.70***  ***    7.28  4.69***  ***    2.61***  ***  2.03** 
[5,8]  0.16  0.56      0.23  0.44      0.12    -0.17 
[5,40]  2.03  2.78***  ***     5.31  3.74***  ***     2.06**  **  1.50 
                       
  Depository receipts (n=81)    No depository receipts (n=582)    Difference 
[-40,-1]  -5.79  -2.98***  ***    -4.38  -4.70***  ***    0.58    0.75 
[0,1]  -0.54  -0.93      0.67  3.07***  ***    2.01**  **  1.00 
[0,5]  0.43  0.61      0.93  3.02***  ***    0.47    0.20 
[0,40]  2.48  1.68  *    3.59  5.20***  ***    0.63    -0.20 
[5,8]  1.40  2.91***  ***    -0.01  -0.03      -2.60***  ***  -2.77 
[5,40]  2.99  1.93*  *     2.63  4.08***  ***     -0.21    -1.04 
                       
 
Three  anti-shareholder  
mechanisms (n=161)   
No  anti-shareholder  
mechanisms  (n=166)    Difference 
[-40,-1]  -0.98  -0.62      -5.14  -2.66***  ***    -1.66*  *  -0.69 
[0,1]  1.05  2.69***  ***    0.27  0.58      -1.28    -3.69*** 
[0,5]  1.31  2.21**  **    0.35  0.57      -1.11    -2.05** 
[0,40]  3.19  2.76***  ***    1.47  1.27  *    -1.05    -1.27 
[5,8]  -0.18  -0.49      -0.03  -0.09      0.27    0.01 
[5,40]  2.09  1.76*  **     1.07  1.02  .     -0.64    0.10 45 
 
 
Table 7 - continued 
Panel B: Share sales 
Event  CAAR %  t-statistic  bootstrapped    CAAR %  t-statistic  bootstrapped    t-statistic  bootstrapped  Wilcoxon  
window      t-statistic        t-statistic    difference  t-statistic  Z-statistic 
                              difference  difference 
                       
  Preference shares (n=479)    No preference shares (n=159)    Difference 
[-40,-1]  3.65  5.01***  ***    11.75  4.45***  ***    2.96***    1.14 
[0,1]  0.45  2.60***  ***    0.43  0.82      -0.04    -0.59 
[0,5]  0.87  3.56***  ***    -0.10  -0.14      -1.34  ***  -2.73*** 
[0,40]  1.12  1.47  *    -4.43  -2.31**  **    -2.69***  ***  -5.97*** 
[5,8]  0.06  0.28      0.40  0.87      0.66    -1.20 
[5,40]  0.36  0.52       -4.06  -2.30**  **     -2.33**  ***  -5.29*** 
                       
  Priority shares (n=190)    No priority shares (n=448)    Difference 
[-40,-1]  1.31  1.27  *    7.52  6.59***  ***    4.02***  ***  4.04*** 
[0,1]  0.38  1.83*  **    0.47  1.91*  *    0.28    -0.02 
[0,5]  1.30  4.33***  ***    0.34  1.04      -2.13**  **  -2.41** 
[0,40]  1.92  2.35**  **    -1.19  -1.18      -2.40**  **  -2.43** 
[5,8]  0.52  1.94*  *    -0.01  -0.03      -1.38  *  -1.94* 
[5,40]  0.85  1.07       -1.41  -1.53  *     -1.86*  **  -2.05** 
                       
  Structured regime (n=375)    No structured regime (n=263)    Difference 
[-40,-1]  4.27  4.31***  ***    7.67  4.95***  ***    1.85*    0.68 
[0,1]  0.38  1.75*  **    0.54  1.68*  **    0.40    -0.64 
[0,5]  0.91  3.16***  ***    0.22  0.50      -1.30  **  -2.31** 
[0,40]  0.57  0.76      -1.45  -0.99      -1.22  ***  -2.69*** 
[5,8]  0.70  3.15***  ***    -0.64  -1.65*  **    -3.00***  ***  -3.33*** 
[5,40]  -0.11  -0.15       -1.63  -1.25       -1.02  **  -2.21** 
                       
  Depository receipts (n=127)    No depository receipts (n=511)    Difference 
[-40,-1]  4.16  3.56***  ***    5.80  6.29***  ***    1.24    -1.22 
[0,1]  0.76  3.18***  ***    0.63  2.15**  ***    -0.64    -1.54 
[0,5]  1.89  4.83***  ***    0.56  1.66*  **    -2.71***  ***  -3.51*** 
[0,40]  3.97  4.30***  ***    -0.14  -1.71*  **    -4.43***  ***  -5.33*** 
[5,8]  0.73  2.62***  ***    -0.13  -0.56      -2.30**  **  -2.55** 
[5,40]  2.16  2.44**  ***     -0.19  -2.55**  ***     -3.50***  ***  -4.04*** 
                       
 
Three anti-shareholder  
mechanisms (n=208)   
No anti-shareholder  
mechanisms (n=154)    Difference 
[-40,-1]  2.83  3.84***  ***    10.91  5.32***  ***    3.70***  ***  1.80* 
[0,1]  0.70  3.35***  ***    1.86  2.01**  **    1.22    -0.16 
[0,5]  1.87  6.21***  ***    1.51  1.48      -0.34    -2.85*** 
[0,40]  3.97  4.76***  ***    -0.30  -0.15      -1.94*  *  -5.40*** 
[5,8]  1.05  4.60***  ***    -0.28  -0.69      -2.85***  ***  -4.15*** 





Table 7 - continued 
Panel C: Option exercises 
Event  CAAR %  t-statistic  bootstrapped  CAAR %  t-statistic  bootstrapped  t-statistic  bootstrapped  Wilcoxon  
window  t-statistic  t-statistic  difference  t-statistic  Z-statistic 
                              difference  difference 
Preference shares (n=1222)  No preference shares (n=170)  Difference 
[-40, -1]  7.22  20.01***  ***  16.46  8.11***  ***  -4.48***  ***  -3.74*** 
[0,1]  -0.05  -0.52  0.85  2.38**  **  -2.43**  **  -2.61*** 
[0,5]  0.00  0.01  1.64  2.83***  ***  -2.74***  ***  -2.73*** 
[0,40]  0.70  2.26**  **  4.51  2.01**  **  -1.68*  -0.99 
[5,8]  -0.27  -1.89*  *  0.41  1.19  -1.82*  *  -1.69* 
[5,40]  0.65  2.35**  **     3.16  1.59        -1.25     0.01 
Priority shares (n=229)  No priority shares (n=1163)  Difference 
[-40, -1]  4.93  9.36***  ***  9.02  19.07***  ***  -5.25***  ***  -3.01*** 
[0,1]  0.25  1.49  0.03  0.27  1.14  0.93 
[0,5]  0.59  2.04**  **  0.13  0.76  1.38  0.30 
[0,40]  0.86  1.37  1.23  2.75***  ***  -0.48  -0.13 
[5,8]  0.40  1.79*  *  -0.30  -1.98**  **  2.60***  **  1.54 
[5,40]  0.37  0.59        1.08  2.73***  ***     -0.97     -0.65 
Structured regime (n=633)  No structured regime (n=759)  Difference 
[-40, -1]  6.70  13.79***  ***  9.72  15.44***  ***  -3.80***  ***  -3.38*** 
[0,1]  0.13  1.28  0.01  0.08  0.69  0.76 
[0,5]  0.27  1.76*  *  0.15  0.62  0.41  0.50 
[0,40]  1.61  4.08***  ***  0.81  1.28  1.07  3.41*** 
[5,8]  0.03  0.23  -0.36  -1.68*  1.56  0.62 
[5,40]  1.32  3.59***  ***     0.66  1.19        1.00     3.59*** 
Depository receipts (n=370)  No depository receipts (n=1022)  Difference 
[-40, -1]  7.99  15.01***  ***  8.47  16.17***  ***  -0.64  1.02 
[0,1]  0.33  2.31**  **  -0.03  -0.30  2.03**  **  1.46 
[0,5]  0.78  3.67***  ***  -0.01  -0.03  2.77***  ***  2.78*** 
[0,40]  0.40  0.79  1.45  2.92***  ***  -1.49  -1.61 
[5,8]  -0.11  -0.70  -0.21  -1.25  0.44  0.32 
[5,40]  -0.49  -1.03        1.48  3.41***  ***     -3.06***  ***  -3.47*** 
Three anti-shareholder 
 mechanisms (n=272) 
No anti-shareholder  
mechanisms (n=83)  Difference 
[-40, -1]  6.09  9.63***  ***  26.07  7.04***  ***  -5.31***  ***  -5.54*** 
[0,1]  0.34  2.33**  **  1.18  1.74*  *  -1.21  -1.24 
[0,5]  0.41  1.86*  *  3.05  2.78***  **  -2.35**  **  -2.97*** 
[0,40]  2.03  3.46***  ***  10.28  2.35**  **  -1.87*  *  -1.90* 
[5,8]  -0.06  -0.31  0.15  0.24  -0.32  0.14 
[5,40]  1.48  2.84***  ***     7.77  2.04**  **     -1.63     -0.71 
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Table 8: Cross-sectional determinants of abnormal return patterns following insider purchases 
Type of insider dummies are binary variables that equal one if the insider performs a function of the corresponding type at the time of the transaction. CEOs are excluded from the 
category Executive Board. The base category is other insiders. Other insiders include large shareholders, the management board and supervisory board of companies in which the 
company has an interest of at least 10%, partners and first degree relatives of CEOs, executive board members and supervisory board members that live in the same household, first 
degree relatives of CEOs, executive board members and supervisory board members that do not live in the same household, but have an equity stake of at least 5% in the company 
and members of the workers'  council. ROE and leverage are the return on equity and debt-to-equity ratio at the end of the year, respectively. 
Ownership dummies (directors, financial institutions, families or individuals, industrial or commercial companies and government) are set to one if shareholders belonging to the 
corresponding category have the largest stake as compared to the other categories. The base case is no blockholder of 5% or more. The economic trend dummies of economic 
growth and economic decline: the base category is the period from March 12 2003 until the end of the sample period in 2007. T-statistics are calculated based on Huber-White 
standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, * represent two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Data are from the period 1999-2007. 
Dependent variable: CAR[0,40] 
OLS     OLS with firm FE     DD     OLS     DD 
      Coefficient  t-statistic     Coefficient  t-statistic     Coefficient  t-statistic     Coefficient  t-statistic     Coefficient  t-statistic 
Constant  4.72  3.92***  7.14  4.20***  0.06  0.05  -6.93  -0.92  -16.32  -2.14** 
Anti-shareholder mechanisms in place         
Anti-shareholder index  -0.76  -1.30  -2.21  -2.18**  0.80  1.37  -2.25  -3.13***  -0.54  -0.63 
Corporate governance regime     
Until 2004  7.20  3.60***      8.88  4.26*** 
Until 2004 * anti-shareholder index  -2.50  -2.61***      -2.88  -2.61*** 
Type of Insider     
CEO  1.36  0.74  0.69  0.39 
Executive board  -0.73  -0.37  -1.59  -0.86 
Supervisory  -3.09  -1.95*  -3.51  -2.22** 
Largest stake in the company     
Directors  -3.02  -0.95  -1.41  -0.43 
Financial companies  3.19  1.16  5.24  1.79* 
Families or individuals  -0.42  -0.14  0.85  0.28 
Ind./Com. Companies  16.17  3.76***  17.59  4.12*** 
Government  13.69  3.77***  15.65  4.34*** 
Accounting data     
Firm size (ln market cap)  0.54  1.82*  0.69  2.42** 
ROE  -0.06  -2.64***  -0.06  -2.79*** 
Leverage  1.66  0.86  1.63  0.82 
Economic trend     
Growth 1-4-99 to 4-9-00  1.12  0.67 
Decline 5-9-00 to 12-03-03  1.24  0.71 
Number of observations  663  663  663  663  663 
Adjusted R




Table 9: Cross-sectional determinants of abnormal return patterns following insider sales 
Type of insider dummies are binary variables that equal one if the insider performs a function of the corresponding type at the time of the transaction. CEOs are excluded from the 
category Executive Board. The base category is other insiders. Other insiders include large shareholders, the management board and supervisory board of companies in which the 
company has an interest of at least 10%, partners and first degree relatives of CEOs, executive board members and supervisory board members that live in the same household, first 
degree relatives of CEOs, executive board members and supervisory board members that do not live in the same household, but have an equity stake of at least 5% in the company 
and members of the workers'  council. ROE and leverage are the return on equity and debt-to-equity ratio at the end of the year, respectively. 
Ownership dummies (directors, financial institutions, families or individuals, industrial or commercial companies and government) are set to one if shareholders belonging to the 
corresponding category have the largest stake as compared to the other categories. The base case is no blockholder of 5% or more. The economic trend dummies of economic 
growth and economic decline: the base category is the period from March 12 2003 until the end of the sample period in 2007. T-statistics are calculated based on Huber-White 
standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, * represent two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Data are from the period 1999-2007. 
Dependent variable: CAR[0,40] 
OLS     OLS with firm FE     DD     OLS     DD 
      Coefficient  t-statistic     Coefficient  t-statistic     Coefficient  t-statistic     Coefficient  t-statistic     Coefficient  t-statistic 
Constant  -4.20  -2.36**  -5.22  -2.15**  -1.88  -1.53  -18.89  -1.71*  -21.54  -1.83* 
Anti-shareholder mechanisms in place         
Anti-shareholder index  2.22  2.97***  2.81  2.10***  1.65  2.33**  1.80  2.26**  0.82  1.06 
Corporate governance regime     
Until 2004  -3.53  -1.26      -0.98  -0.31 
Until 2004 * anti-shareholder index  0.87  0.72      0.85  0.69 
Type of Insider     
CEO  -8.23  -2.29**  -8.20  -2.39** 
Executive board  -0.44  -0.21  -1.12  -0.60 
Supervisory  -2.50  -1.03  -3.60  -1.57 
Largest stake in the company     
Directors  -3.94  -1.09  -2.98  -0.80 
Financial companies  0.39  0.11  1.25  0.34 
Families or individuals  1.60  0.23  3.10  0.41 
Ind./Com. Companies  1.25  0.19  2.53  0.37 
Government  -10.05  -1.17  -9.77  -1.12 
Accounting data     
Firm size (ln market cap)  0.89  2.05**  1.02  2.25** 
ROE  0.00  -0.17  0.00  -0.06 
Leverage  2.51  1.38  2.76  1.40 
Economic trend     
Growth 1-4-99 to 4-9-00  0.82  0.31 
Decline 5-9-00 to 12-03-03  -2.47  -1.35 
Number of observations  739  739  739  739  739 
Adjusted R
2  1.41%  16.81%  1.45%  5.90%  5.53% 49 
 
 
Table 10: Cross-sectional determinants of abnormal return patterns following insider option exercises 
Type of insider dummies are binary variables that equal one if the insider performs a function of the corresponding type at the time of exercise. CEOs are 
excluded  from  the  category  Executive  Board.  The  base  category  is  other  insiders.  Other  insiders  include  large  shareholders,  the  management  board  and 
supervisory board of companies in which the company has an interest of at least 10%, partners and first degree relatives of CEOs, executive board members and 
supervisory board members that live in the same household, first degree relatives of CEOs, executive board members and supervisory board members that do not 
live in the same household, but have an equity stake of at least 5% in the company and members of the workers'  council. ROE and Leverage are the return on 
equity and debt-to-equity ratio at the end of the year, respectively. 
Ownership dummies (directors, financial institutions, families or individuals, industrial or commercial companies and government) are set to one if shareholders 
belonging to the corresponding category have the largest stake as compared to the other categories. The base case is no blockholder of 5% or more. The economic 
trend dummies of economic growth and economic decline: the base category is the period from March 12 2003 until the end of the sample period in 2007. T-
statistics are calculated based on Huber-White standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, * represent two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively. Data are from the period 1999-2007. 
Dependent variable: CAR[0,40] 
OLS     OLS with firm FE     DD     OLS     DD 
      Coefficient  t-statistic     Coefficient  t-statistic     Coefficient  t-statistic     Coefficient  t-statistic     Coefficient  t-statistic 
Constant  3.27  2.20**  -4.19  -0.64  -4.20  -2.47**  14.17  1.60  5.84  0.74 
Anti-shareholder mechanisms in place         
Anti-shareholder index  -1.28  -1.72*  3.27  0.81  3.29  3.66***  -0.26  -0.25  1.20  1.53 
Corporate governance regime       
Until 2004  10.70  3.57***      5.25  1.48 
Until 2004 * anti-shareholder 
index  -5.99  -4.27***      -3.39  -2.04** 
Type of Insider       
CEO  -1.55  -0.46  -1.55  -0.44 
Executive board  -1.98  -0.96  -1.97  -0.98 
Supervisory  -3.71  -1.14  -5.56  -1.88* 
Largest stake in the company       
Directors  -6.01  -2.01  -4.73  -1.59 
Financial companies  -8.75  -3.09***  -7.60  -2.68** 
Families or individuals  -10.42  -1.80*  -8.95  -1.49 
Ind./Com. Companies  0.59  0.10  0.79  0.13 





Table 10: Cross-sectional determinants of abnormal return patterns following insider option exercises - continued 
      Coefficient  t-statistic     Coefficient  t-statistic     Coefficient  t-statistic     Coefficient  t-statistic     Coefficient  t-statistic 
Accounting data       
Firm size (ln market cap)  0.01  0.04  0.25  0.79 
ROE  -0.14  -5.46***  -0.15  -5.21*** 
Leverage  -0.04  -0.73  -0.05  -0.98 
Economic trend       
Growth 1-4-99 to 4-9-00  4.24  2.30**   
Decline 5-9-00 to 12-03-03  -4.28  -3.31***   
Exercise characteristics   
Exercise at vesting  1.39  1.42  2.49  2.73*** 
Exercise at expiration  0.89  0.72  0.20  0.15 
Full sale of acquired shares  0.74  0.41  0.78  0.42 
Firm FE        YES                   
Number of observations  1392  1392  1392  1392  1392 
Adjusted R









Table 11: Cross-sectional determinants of abnormal return patterns preceding insider purchases 
Type of insider dummies are binary variables that equal one if the insider performs a function of the corresponding type at the time of the transaction. CEOs are excluded from the 
category Executive Board. The base category is other insiders. Other insiders include large shareholders, the management board and supervisory board of companies in which the 
company has an interest of at least 10%, partners and first degree relatives of CEOs, executive board members and supervisory board members that live in the same household, first 
degree relatives of CEOs, executive board members and supervisory board members that do not live in the same household, but have an equity stake of at least 5% in the company 
and members of the workers'  council. ROE and leverage are the return on equity and debt-to-equity ratio at the end of the year, respectively. 
Ownership dummies (directors, financial institutions, families or individuals, industrial or commercial companies and government) are set to one if shareholders belonging to the 
corresponding category have the largest stake as compared to the other categories. The base case is no blockholder of 5% or more. The economic trend dummies of economic 
growth and economic decline: the base category is the period from March 12 2003 until the end of the sample period in 2007. T-statistics are calculated based on Huber-White 
standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, * represent two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Data are from the period 1999-2007. 
Dependent variable: CAR[-40,-1] 
OLS     OLS with firm FE     DD     OLS     DD 
      Coefficient  t-statistic     Coefficient  t-statistic     Coefficient  t-statistic     Coefficient  t-statistic     Coefficient  t-statistic 
Constant  -6.91  -3.58***    -1.16  -0.48    1.39  0.93    0.40  0.03    3.58  0.26 
Anti-shareholder mechanisms in place                             
Anti-shareholder index  1.42  1.55    -2.04  -1.42    0.59  0.66    5.07  4.42***    1.53  1.38 
Corporate governance regime                             
Until 2004              -13.43  -4.23***          -16.97  -6.25*** 
Until 2004 * anti-shareholder index              2.48  1.63          4.17  2.95*** 
Type of Insider                             
CEO                    0.08  0.03    -4.88  -1.78* 
Executive board                    8.22  3.28***    5.42  2.30** 
Supervisory board                    8.98  3.95***    7.01  3.11*** 
Largest stake in the company                             
Directors                    -8.89  -1.36    -12.23  -1.86* 
Financial companies                    -17.03  -2.91***    -19.05  -3.22*** 
Families or individuals                    -12.37  -1.93*    -5.58  -0.90 
Ind./Com. Companies                    -1.58  -0.24    -6.07  -0.93 
Government                    -20.70  -2.85**    -25.88  -3.47*** 
Accounting data                             
Firm size (ln market cap)                    0.23  0.51    0.53  1.16 
ROE                    -0.02  -0.79    -0.03  -1.11 
Leverage                    9.01  3.40***    6.23  2.29** 
Economic trend                             
Growth 1-4-99 to 4-9-00                    -18.52  -6.90***       
   Decline 5-9-00 to 12-03-03                             -15.53  -7.00***          
Number of observations  663  663  663  663  663 
Adjusted R
2  0.27%  47.29%  3.65%  14.55%  11.46% 53 
 
 
Table 12: Cross-sectional determinants of abnormal return patterns preceding insider sales 
Type of insider dummies are binary variables that equal one if the insider performs a function of the corresponding type at the time of the transaction. CEOs are excluded from the 
category Executive Board. The base category is other insiders. Other insiders include large shareholders, the management board and supervisory board of companies in which the 
company has an interest of at least 10%, partners and first degree relatives of CEOs, executive board members and supervisory board members that live in the same household, first 
degree relatives of CEOs, executive board members and supervisory board members that do not live in the same household, but have an equity stake of at least 5% in the company 
and members of the workers'  council. ROE and leverage are the return on equity and debt-to-equity ratio at the end of the year, respectively. 
Ownership dummies (directors, financial institutions, families or individuals, industrial or commercial companies and government) are set to one if shareholders belonging to the 
corresponding category have the largest stake as compared to the other categories. The base case is no blockholder of 5% or more. The economic trend dummies of economic 
growth and economic decline: the base category is the period from March 12 2003 until the end of the sample period in 2007. T-statistics are calculated based on Huber-White 
standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, * represent two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Data are from the period 1999-2007. 
Dependent variable: CAR[-40,-1] 
OLS     OLS with firm FE     DD     OLS     DD 
      Coefficient  t-statistic     Coefficient  t-statistic     Coefficient  t-statistic     Coefficient  t-statistic     Coefficient  t-statistic 
Constant  10.11  5.52***  5.49  1.96*  3.83  2.60***  -34.47  -3.09***  -44.98  -3.96*** 
Anti-shareholder mechanisms in place         
Anti-shareholder index  -2.70  -3.64***  0.03  0.01  0.70  0.83  -3.01  -4.08***  -0.39  -0.41 
Corporate governance regime     
Until 2004  8.54  2.89***      11.56  3.66*** 
Until 2004 * anti-shareholder index  -4.32  -3.39***      -4.90  -3.28*** 
Type of Insider     
CEO  0.90  0.24  2.31  0.63 
Executive board  -2.85  -1.24  -2.13  -0.95 
Supervisory board  -1.83  -0.57  -3.17  -0.94 
Largest stake in the company     
Directors  15.75  5.23***  17.49  5.42*** 
Financial companies  14.62  5.32***  16.94  5.33*** 
Families or individuals  -1.55  -0.14  3.99  0.42 
Ind./Com. Companies  28.31  4.20***  31.09  4.43*** 
Government  6.30  1.51  9.39  2.82*** 
Accounting data     
Firm size (ln market cap)  1.72  3.55***  1.87  3.92*** 
ROE  -0.11  -3.95***  -0.08  -3.50*** 
Leverage  -6.26  -3.49***  -7.05  -3.68*** 
Economic trend     
Growth 1-4-99 to 4-9-00  10.81  2.79*** 
   Decline 5-9-00 to 12-03-03                             1.11  0.66          
Number of observations  739  739  739  739  739 
Adjusted R
2  1.70%  27.95%  2.31%  10.18%  9.60% 54 
 
 
Table 13: Cross-sectional determinants of abnormal return patterns preceding insider option exercises 
Type of insider dummies are binary variables that equal one if the insider performs a function of the corresponding type at the time of exercise. CEOs are excluded 
from the category Executive Board. The base category is other insiders. Other insiders include large shareholders, the management board and supervisory board of 
companies in which the company has an interest of at least 10%, partners and first degree relatives of CEOs, executive board members and supervisory board 
members that live in the same household, first degree relatives of CEOs, executive board members and supervisory board members that do not live in the same 
household, but have an equity stake of at least 5% in the company and members of the workers'  council. ROE and Leverage are the return on equity and debt-to-
equity ratio at the end of the year, respectively. 
Ownership dummies (directors, financial institutions, families or individuals, industrial or commercial companies and government) are set to one if shareholders 
belonging to the corresponding category have the largest stake as compared to the other categories. The base case is no blockholder of 5% or more. The economic 
trend dummies of economic growth and economic decline: the base category is the period from March 12 2003 until the end of the sample period in 2007. T-
statistics are calculated based on Huber-White standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, * represent two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. Data are from the period 1999-2007. 
Dependent variable: CAR[-40,-1] 
OLS     OLS with firm FE     DD     OLS     DD 
      Coefficient  t-statistic     Coefficient  t-statistic     Coefficient  t-statistic     Coefficient  t-statistic     Coefficient  t-statistic 
Constant  14.46  9.89***  3.12  0.97  8.09  8.93***  36.40  4.18***  20.11  2.44** 
Anti-shareholder mechanisms in place         
Anti-shareholder index  -3.47  -5.07***  2.96  1.60  -0.79  -1.58  -2.30  -2.01**  0.05  0.06 
Corporate governance regime       
Until 2004  11.63  4.52***      14.54  3.60*** 
Until 2004 * anti-shareholder 
index  -4.66  -4.02***      -5.84  -3.09*** 
Type of Insider       
CEO  -4.62  -1.23  -4.66  -1.24 
Executive board  -3.62  -1.87*  -3.26  -1.66* 
Supervisory board  2.67  0.57  0.00  0.00 
Largest stake in the company       
Directors  -5.11  -1.51  -2.28  -0.62 
Financial companies  -2.73  -0.87  0.24  0.07 
Families or individuals  -10.67  -1.43  -7.40  -0.87 
Ind./Com. Companies  10.04  2.07**  11.51  2.07** 








Table 13: Cross-sectional determinants of abnormal return patterns preceding insider option exercises - continued 
      Coefficient  t-statistic     Coefficient  t-statistic     Coefficient  t-statistic     Coefficient  t-statistic     Coefficient  t-statistic 
Accounting data       
Firm size (ln market cap)  -1.03  -3.27***  -0.61  -1.93* 
ROE  0.01  0.43  0.02  0.81 
Leverage  -0.11  -2.15**  -0.12  -2.25** 
Economic trend       
Growth 1-4-99 to 4-9-00  12.68  5.84***   
Decline 5-9-00 to 12-03-03  -1.97  -1.6   
Exercise characteristics   
Exercise at vesting  -2.80  -2.22**  -0.96  -0.76 
Exercise at expiration  -2.50  -1.86*  -4.32  -3.29*** 
   Full sale of acquired shares                             3.00  1.31     2.99  1.26 
Number of observations  1392  1392  1392  1392  1392 
Adjusted R






Table 14: Cross-sectional determinants of abnormal return patterns around insider transactions 
The dependent variable is lnR(40), defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio (1+CAR[0;40])/(1+CAR[-40;-1]) Type of insider 
dummies (CEO, Executive board and Supervisory board) are binary variables that equal one if an insider performs a function of 
the corresponding type at the time of exercise. CEOs are excluded from the category Executive Board. Other insiders include 
large shareholders, the management board and supervisory board of companies in which the company has an interest of at least 
10%, partners and first degree relatives of CEOs, executive board members and supervisory board members that live in the same 
household, first degree relatives of CEOs, executive board members and supervisory board members that do not live in the same 
household, but have an equity stake of at least 5% in the company and members of the workers'  council. ROE and Leverage are 
the return on equity and debt-to-equity ratio at the end of the year, respectively. 
Ownership  dummies  (directors,  financial  institutions,  families  or  individuals,  industrial  or  commercial  companies  and 
government) are set to one if shareholders belonging to the corresponding category have the largest stake as compared to the other 
categories. The base case is no blockholder of 5% or more. The economic trend dummies of economic growth and economic 
decline: the base category is the period from March 12 2003 until the end of the sample period in 2007. T-statistics are calculated 
based on Huber-White standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, * represent two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level, respectively. Data are from the period 1999-2007. 
      Dependent variable: lnR(40) 
PURCHASES     SALES     OPTION EXERCISES 
      Coefficient  t-statistic     Coefficient  t-statistic     Coefficient  t-statistic 
Constant  0.020  0.11  0.148  0.97  -0.197  -1.99** 
Type of Insider 
CEO  0.073  1.38  -0.124  -1.51  0.033  0.84 
Executive board  -0.104  -2.96***  0.041  1.3  0.013  0.56 
Supervisory  -0.146  -3.81***  -0.001  -0.02  -0.034  -0.62 
Anti-shareholder mechanisms in place 
Anti-shareholder index  -0.095  -3.9***  0.038  3.91***  0.032  2.82*** 
Largest stake in the company 
Directors  0.057  0.72  -0.212  -3.27***  -0.017  -0.53 
Financial companies  0.232  3.33***  -0.135  -2.73***  -0.066  -2.39** 
Families or individuals  0.125  1.68*  0.043  0.23  -0.011  -0.11 
Ind./Com. Companies  0.142  1.85*  -0.243  -3.1***  -0.140  -2.05** 
Government  0.413  4.4***  -0.182  -1.45  -0.176  -3.03*** 
Accounting data 
Firm size (ln market cap)  0.000  0.03  -0.008  -1.23  0.010  2.69*** 
ROE  -0.001  -1.05  0.002  2.72***  -0.002  -5.23*** 
Leverage  -0.125  -2.59***  0.113  3.72***  0.001  1.12 
Economic trend 
Growth 1-4-99 to 4-9-00  0.190  5.92***  -0.140  -4.36***  0.009  0.37 
Decline 5-9-00 to 12-03-03  0.220  5.53***  -0.026  -0.65  -0.068  -3.92*** 
Exercise characteristics 
Exercise at vesting  0.019  1.32 
Exercise at expiration  0.045  2.83*** 
Full sale of acquired shares  -0.027  -0.99 
                              Mean of dependent variable  0.098  -0.066  -0.081 
Std of dependent variable  0.365  0.363  0.200 
Number of observations  651  724  858 
Adjusted R
2  12.49%  11.84%  8.74% 57 
 
 
Table 15:  Cross-sectional determinants of abnormal return patterns around insider transactions: 
the effect of corporate governance changes in 2004 
The dependent variable is lnR(40), defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio (1+CAR[0;40])/(1+CAR[-40;-1]). Type of insider 
dummies are binary variables that equal one if the insider performs a function of the corresponding type at the time of exercise. 
CEOs  are  excluded  from  the  category  Executive  Board.  The  base  category  is  other  insiders.  Other  insiders  include  large 
shareholders, the management board and supervisory board of companies in which the company has an interest of at least 10%, 
partners and first degree relatives of CEOs, executive board members and supervisory board members that live in the same 
household, first degree relatives of CEOs, executive board members and supervisory board members that do not live in the same 
household, but have an equity stake of at least 5% in the company and members of the workers'  council. ROE and Leverage are 
the return on equity and debt-to-equity ratio at the end of the year, respectively. 
Ownership  dummies  (directors,  financial  institutions,  families  or  individuals,  industrial  or  commercial  companies  and 
government) are set to one if shareholders belonging to the corresponding category have the largest stake as compared to the other 
categories. The base case is no blockholder of 5% or more. Until 2004 is a binary variable that takes value 1 if the transaction 
occurred in 2004 or earlier.. T-statistics are calculated based on Huber-White standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, * 
represent two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Data are from the period 1999-2007. 
      Dependent variable: lnR(40) 
PURCHASES     SALES     OPTION EXERCISES 
      Coefficient  t-statistic     Coefficient  t-statistic     Coefficient  t-statistic 
Constant  -0.110  -0.62  0.246  1.58  -0.124  -1.29 
Type of Insider 
CEO  0.126  2.22**  -0.173  -2.10**  0.029  0.75 
Executive board  -0.075  -2.31**  0.015  0.55  0.012  0.52 
Supervisory  -0.113  -3.17***  0.007  0.16  -0.052  -1.07 
Anti-shareholder mechanisms in place 
Anti-shareholder index  -0.016  -0.97  0.010  0.95  -0.006  -0.5 
Corporate governance regime 
Until 2004  0.292  5.99***  -0.138  -3.28***  -0.107  -3.06*** 
Until 2004 * anti-shareholder 
index  -0.084  -3.36***  0.054  3.47***  0.043  2.05** 
Largest stake in the company 
Directors  0.119  1.57  -0.241  -3.75***  -0.028  -0.86 
Financial companies  0.271  3.86***  -0.174  -3.36***  -0.070  -2.46** 
Families or individuals  0.032  0.47  -0.016  -0.10  -0.008  -0.08 
Ind./Com. Companies  0.214  2.94***  -0.276  -3.40***  -0.131  -1.95* 
Government  0.494  4.96***  -0.220  -1.82*  -0.161  -2.64*** 
Accounting data 
Firm size (ln market cap)  -0.003  -0.44  -0.009  -1.37  0.009  2.41** 
ROE  -0.001  -1.00  0.001  2.16**  -0.002  -5.53*** 
Leverage  -0.098  -2.06**  0.124  3.54***  0.000  0.61 
Exercise characteristics 
Exercise at vesting  0.033  2.46** 
Exercise at expiration  0.047  2.86*** 
Full sale of acquired shares  -0.023  -0.8 
                              Mean of dependent variable  0.098  -0.066  -0.081 
Std of dependent variable  0.365  0.363  0.200 
Number of observations  651  724  869 
Adjusted R
2  11.86%  11.03%  6.72% 
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